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in the network are connected either directly or indirectly, empirical modeling using an
equilibrium approach is cumbersome, since the testable implications from an equilibrium
generally involve all the players of the game, whereas a researcher’s data set may con-
tain only a fraction of these players in practice. This paper develops a tractable empirical
model of linear interactions where each agent, after observing part of his neighbors’ types,
not knowing the full information network, uses best responses that are linear in his and
other players’ types that he observes, based on simple beliefs about other players’ strate-
gies. We provide conditions on information networks and beliefs such that best responses
take an explicit form with multiple intuitive features. Furthermore, the best responses
reveal how local payoff interdependence among agents is translated into local stochastic
dependence of their actions, allowing the econometrician to perform asymptotic inference
without having to observe all the players in the game or having to know precisely the
sampling process.
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21. Introduction
Interactions between agents - for example, through personal or business relations -
generally lead to their actions being correlated. In fact, such correlated behaviors form
the basis of identifying and estimating peer effects, neighborhood effects, or more gen-
erally social interactions in the literature. (See Blume, Brock, Durlauf, and Ioannides
(2010) and Durlauf and Ioannides (2010) for a review of this literature.)
Empirical modeling becomes nontrivial when one takes seriously the fact that people
are often connected directly or indirectly on a large complex network, observing some
others’ types. Strategic environments are highly heterogeneous across agents as each
agent occupies a nearly “unique” position in the network. Information sharing poten-
tially creates a complex form of cross-sectional dependence among the observed actions
of agents, and yet the econometrician observes only a small fraction of the agents on
the network, and rarely observes the entire network which governs the cross-sectional
dependence structure.
The main contribution of this paper is to develop a tractable empirical model of linear
interactions among agents with the following three major features. First, assuming a
large game on a complex, exogenous network, our empirical model does not require the
agents to observe the full network. Instead, we assume that agents observe part of the
type information of those who are local to them.1
Second, our model explains strategic interdependence among agents through corre-
lated observed behaviors. In this model, the cross-sectional local dependence structure
among the observed actions reflects the network of strategic interdependence among the
agents. Most importantly, unlike most incomplete information game models in the lit-
erature, our set-up allows for information sharing on unobservables, i.e., each agent is
allowed to observe his neighbors’ payoff-relevant signals that are not observed by the
econometrician.
Third, the econometrician does not need to observe the whole set of players in the game
for inference. It suffices that he observes many (potentially) non-random samples of local
interactions. The inference procedure that this paper proposes is asymptotically valid
independently of the actual sampling process, as long as the sampling process satisfies
certain weak conditions. Accommodating a wide range of sampling processes is useful
because random sampling is rarely used for the collection of network data, and a precise
formulation of the actual sampling process is often difficult in practice.
1For example, a recent paper by Breza, Chandrasekhar, and Tahbaz-Salehi (2018) documents that people in
a social network may lack substantial knowledge of the network and that such informational assumptions
may have significant implications for the predictions of network models.
3A standard approach for studying social interactions is to model them as a game, and
use the game’s equilibrium strategies to derive predictions and testable implications.
Such an approach is cumbersome in our set-up. Since a particular realization of any
agent’s type affects all the other agents’ actions in equilibrium through a chain of infor-
mation sharing, each agent needs to form a “correct” belief about the entire information
graph. Apart from such an assumption being highly unrealistic, it also implies that pre-
dictions from an equilibrium that generate testable implications usually involve all the
players in the game, when it is often the case that only a fraction of the players are
observed in practice. Thus, an empirical analysis which regards the players in the re-
searcher’s sample as coincident with the actual set of players in the game may suffer
from a lack of external validity when the target population is a large game involving
many more players than those present in the actual sample.
Instead, this paper adopts an approach of behavioral modeling, where it is assumed
that each agent, not knowing fully the information sharing relations, optimizes according
to his simple beliefs about other players’ strategies. The crucial part of our behavioral
assumption is a primitive form of belief projection which says that each agent, not knowing
who his payoff neighbors observe, projects his own beliefs about other players onto his
payoff neighbors. More specifically, if agent i gives more weight to agent j than to agent
k, agent i believes that each of his payoff neighbors s does the same in comparing agents
j and k. Here the “weights” represent the strategic importance of other players, and belief
projection can be viewed as a rule of thumb for an agent who needs to form expections of
the actions of the players, not knowing who they observe. When the strategic importance
of one player to another is based primarily on some “vertical” characteristics of the former,
such as skills or assets, the assumption of belief projection does not seem unrealistic.2
A major motivation for our use of belief projection comes from what it delivers for
empirical modeling. Most importantly, our belief projection assumption yields an explicit
form of the best response which has intuitive features. For example, the best response is
such that each agent i gives more weights to those agents with a higher local centrality
to him, where the local centrality of agent j to agent i is said to be high if and only if a
high fraction of agents whose actions affect agent i’s payoff have their payoffs affected by
2Belief projection in our paper can be viewed as a variant of inter-personal projection studied in behavioral
economics. A related behavioral concept is projection bias of Loewenstein, O’Donohue, and Rabin (2003)
which refers to the tendency of a person projecting his own current taste to his future taste. See also Van
Boven, Loewenstein, and Dunning (2003) who reported experiment results on the interpersonal projection
of tastes onto other agents. Since formation of belief is often tied to the information set the agent has, belief
projection is closely related to information projection in Madara´sz (2012) who focuses on the tendency of
a person projecting his information to other agents’ information. The main difference here is that our focus
is to formulate the assumption in a way that is useful for inference using observational data on actions on
a network.
4agent j’s action. Also, each agent responds to a change in his own type more sensitively
when there are stronger strategic interactions, due to what we call the reflection effect.
The reflection effect of player i captures the way player i’s type affects his own action
through his payoff neighbors whose payoffs are affected by player i’s types and actions.
The best responses reveal a precise form of a local dependence structure among ob-
served actions from which we can derive minimal conditions for the sampling process
and the econometrician’s observation under which asymptotic inference is feasible. It
turns out that the econometrician does not need to observe all the players in the game,
nor does he need to know precisely the sampling process. Furthermore, the best response
from the belief assumption provides a testable implication for information sharing on un-
observables in data. The main idea is as follows. When the agents are strategically inter-
dependent, the best response gives a linear reduced form for observed actions where the
cross-sectional correlation of residuals indicates information sharing on unobservables.
Hence as the Supplemental Note of this paper shows, using cross-sectional correlation of
residuals, one can test for the role of information sharing on unobservables.
One might be interested in comparing the predictions from our behavioral model to
those from an equilibrium model. For this we consider a simple linear interactions model
as a complete information game where one can compute the equilibrium explicitly. First,
we show that under mild conditions the best response strategies converge to the equilib-
rium strategies as the level of rationality deepens and the information set for each agent
expands. Furthermore, we compare the two models in terms of average network exter-
nality using simulated graphs, and show that both models have similar predictions when
the payoff externality parameter is between 0.5 and −0.5.
We investigate the finite sample properties of asymptotic inference through Monte
Carlo simulations using various payoff graphs. The results show reasonable performance
of the inference procedures. In particular, the size and the power of the test for the
strategic interaction parameter work well in finite samples. We apply our methods to
an empirical application which studies the decision of state presence by municipalities,
revisiting Acemoglu, Garc´ıa-Jimeno, and Robinson (2015). We consider an incomplete
information game model which permits information sharing. The fact that our best re-
sponses explicitly reveal the local dependence structure means that it is unnecessary to
separately correct for spatial correlation following, for example, the procedure of Conley
(1999).
The literature of social interactions often looks for evidence of interactions through
correlated behaviors. For example, linear interactions models investigate correlation be-
tween Yi and the average of outcomes over agent i’s neighbors. See for example Man-
ski (1993), De Giorgi, Pellizzari, and Redaelli (2010), Bramoulle´, Djebbari, and Fortin
5(2009) and Blume, Brock, Durlauf, and Jayaraman (2015) for identification analysis
in linear interactions models, and see Calvo´-Armengol, Pattacchini, and Zenou (2009)
for an application in the study of peer effects. Goldsmith-Pinkham and Imbens (2013)
considers nonlinear interactions on a social network and discusses endogenous network
formation. These models often assume that we observe many independent samples of
such interactions, where each independent sample constitutes a game which contains
the entire set of the players in the game.
In the context of a complete information game, a linear interaction model on a large
social network can generally be estimated without assuming independent samples. The
outcome equations frequently take the form of spatial autoregressive models which have
been actively studied in the literature of spatial econometrics (Anselin (1988)). A recent
study by Johnsson and Moon (2016) consider a model of linear interactions on a large
social network which allows for endogenous network formation. Developing inference on
a large game model with nonlinear interactions is more challenging. See Menzel (2016),
Xu (2015), Song (2014), Xu and Lee (2015), and Yang and Lee (2016) for a large game
model of nonlinear interactions. This large game approach is suitable when the data set
does not have many independent samples of interactions. One of the major issues in the
large game approach is that the econometrician often observes only part of the agents in
the original game.3
Our approach of empirical modeling is also based on a large game model which is
closer to the tradition of linear interactions models in the sense that our approach at-
tempts to explain strategic interactions through correlated behaviors among neighbors.
In our set-up, the cross-sectional dependence of the observed actions is not merely a
nuisance that complicates asymptotic inference; it provides the very piece of informa-
tion that reveals the strategic interdependence among agents. The correlated behaviors
also arise in equilibrium in models of complete information games or games with types
that are either privately or commonly observable. (See Bramoulle´, Djebbari, and Fortin
(2009) and Blume, Brock, Durlauf, and Jayaraman (2015).) However, as emphasized
before, such an approach can be cumbersome in our context of a large game primarily
because the testable implications from the model typically involve the entire set of play-
ers, when in many applications the econometrician observes only a small subset of the
players in the large game. After finishing the first draft of paper, we learned of a recent
paper by Eraslan and Tang (2017) who model the interactions as a Bayesian game on
3Song (2014), Xu (2015), Johnsson and Moon (2016), Xu and Lee (2015) and Yang and Lee (2016)
assume observing all the players in the large game. In contrast, Menzel (2016) allows for observing i.i.d.
samples from the many players, but assumes that each agent’s payoff involves all the other agents’ actions
exchangeably.
6a large network with private link information. Like our paper, they permit the agents
not to observe the full network, and show identification of the model primitives adopt-
ing a Bayesian Nash equilibrium as a solution concept. One of the major differences of
our paper from theirs is that our paper permits information sharing on unobservables,
so that the actions of neighboring agents are potentially correlated even after controlling
for observables.
A departure from the equilibrium approach in econometrics is not new in the literature.
Aradillas-Lopez and Tamer (2008) studied implications of various rationality assumptions
for identification of the parameters in a game. Unlike their approach, our focus is on a
large game where many agents interact with each other on a single complex network,
and, instead of considering all the beliefs which rationalize observed choices, we consider
a particular set of beliefs that satisfy a simple rule and yield an explicit form of best
responses. (See also Goldfarb and Xiao (2011) and Hwang (2016) for empirical research
adopting behavioral modeling for interacting agents.)
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce an incomplete informa-
tion game of interactions with information sharing. This section derives the crucial result
of best responses under simple belief rules. In this section, we discuss the issue of ex-
ternal validity of network externality comparing two simple interactions models: a com-
plete information game with equilibrium strategies and our behavioral model. Section 3
focuses on econometric inference. This section presents inference procedures, explains
a situation where we can measure the role of information sharing on unobservables and
compares our approach with a standard linear-in-means model. Section 4 investigates
the finite sample properties of our inference procedure through a study of Monte Carlo
simulations. Section 5 presents an empirical application on state capacity among munic-
ipalities. Section 6 concludes. Due to the space constraints, the technical proofs of the
results are found in the Supplemental Note of this paper. The Supplemental Note also
contains other materials including extensions to a model of information sharing among
many agents over time and testing for information sharing on unobservables.
2. Strategic Interactions with Information Sharing
2.1. A Model of Interactions with Information Sharing
Strategic interactions among a large number of information-sharing agents can be
modeled as an incomplete information game. Let N be the set of a finite yet large number
of players. Each player i ∈ N is endowed with his type vector (Ti, ηi), where ηi is a private
type and Ti a sharable type. As we will elaborate later, information ηi is kept private to
7player i whereas Ti is observed by his “neighbors” which we define later. Throughout this
paper, we set Ti = (X ′i, εi)
′, where Xi is the vector of characteristics of player i that are
observed by the econometrician, and εi the unobserved characteristic of player i. Thus
the model permits information sharing on unobservables εi. This feature marks a significant
departure from many existing models of social interaction with incomplete information.
The latter models often assume that variables that the econometrician observes are pub-
lic among the agents whereas the variables that the econometrician does not observe are
kept private among themselves. (e.g. Blume, Brock, Durlauf, and Jayaraman (2015))
To capture strategic interactions among players, let us introduce an undirected graph
GP = (N,EP ), where EP denotes the set of edges ij, i, j ∈ N with i 6= j, and each edge
ij ∈ EP represents that the action of player i affects player j’s payoff.4 We denote NP (j)
to be the GP -neighborhood of player j, i.e., the collection of players whose actions affect
the payoff of player j:
NP (j) = {i ∈ N : ij ∈ EP},
and let nP (j) = |NP (j)|. We define NP (i) = NP (i) ∪ {i} and let nP (i) = |NP (i)|.
Player i choosing action yi ∈ Y with the other players choosing y−i = (yj)j 6=i obtains
payoff:
ui(yi, y−i, T, ηi) = yi
(
X ′i,1γ0 +X
′
i,2δ0 + β0yi + εi + ηi
)
− 1
2
y2i ,(2.1)
where T = (Ti)i∈N , Xi,1 and Xi,2 are subvectors of Xi,
X i,2 =
1
nP (i)
∑
k∈NP (i)
Xk,2, and yi =
1
nP (i)
∑
k∈NP (i)
yk,
if NP (i) 6= ∅, and X i,2 = 0 and yi = 0 otherwise.5 Thus the payoff depends on other
players’ actions and types only through those of his GP -neighbors. We call GP the payoff
graph.
The parameter β0 measures the payoff externality among agents. As for β0, we make
the following assumption:
Assumption 2.1. 0 ≤ |β0| < 1.
This assumption is often used to derive a characterization of a unique pure strategy
equilibrium in the literature. (See e.g. Bramoulle´, Djebbari, and Fortin (2009) and
Blume, Brock, Durlauf, and Jayaraman (2015) for its use.) When β0 > 0, the game is
4A graph G = (N,E) is undirected if ij ∈ E whenever ji ∈ E for all i, j ∈ N .
5In the Supplemental Note, we consider a more general specification which permits different weights given
to the GP -neighbors.
8called a game of strategic complements and, when β0 < 0, it is called a game of strategic
substitutes.
Let us introduce information sharing relations in the form of a directed graph (or a
network) GI = (N,EI) on N so that each ij in EI represents the edge from player i
to player j, where the presence of edge ij joining players i and j indicates that Ti is
observed by player j. Hence the presence of an edge ij between agents i and j represents
information flow from i to j. This paper calls graph GI the information graph. For each
j ∈ N , define
NI(j) = {i ∈ N : ij ∈ EI},
that is, the set of GI-neighbors observed by player j.6 Also let N I(i) = NI(i) ∪ {i}, and
nI(i) = |N I(i)|.
In this paper, we do not assume that each agent knows the whole information graph
GI and the payoff graph GP . To be precise about each agent’s information set, let us
introduce some notation. For each i ∈ N , we set NP,1(i) = NP (i) and N I,1(i) = N I(i),
and for m ≥ 2, define recursively
NP,m(i) =
⋃
j∈NP (i)
NP,m−1(j), and N I,m(i) =
⋃
j∈NI(i)
N I,m−1(j).
Thus NP,m(i) denotes the set of players which consist of player i and those players who
are connected to player i through at most m edges in GP , and similarly with N I,m(i).
Also, define NP,m(i) = NP,m(i) \ {i} and NI,m(i) = N I,m(i) \ {i}. Define for m ≥ 1,
Ii,m−1 = (TNI,m(i), ηi, NP,m+1(i), NP,m(i), ..., NP,1(i), N I,m(i)),(2.2)
where TNI,m(i) = (Tj)j∈NI,m(i). We use Ii,m to represent the information set of agent i.
For example, when agent i has Ii,0 as his information set, it means that agent i knows
the set of agents whose types he observes (i.e., NI(i)), the set of agents j whose actions
affect his payoff (i.e., NP (i)) and the set of agents whose actions affect the payoff of his
GP -neighbors j (i.e., NP,2(i)), and the sharable types of his GI-neighbors (i.e., TNI(i)) and
his own private signal ηi. As for the payoff graph and information graph, we make the
following assumption.
Assumption 2.2. For each i ∈ N and m ≥ 1,
NP,m+1(i) ⊂ N I,m(i).
6More precisely, the neighbors in NI(j) are called in-neighbors and nI(i) = |NI(j)| in-degree. Throughout
this paper, we simply use the term neighbors and degrees, unless specified otherwise.
9This assumption essentially requires that each agent observes their GP neighbors and
their payoff relevant neighbors. For example, an agent has information Ii,0, this implies
that he knows who his GP neighbors are and who the GP -neighbors of his GP neighbors
are.
The assumption on GI only requires what each set N I,m(i) should at least include but
not what it should exclude. Hence all the results of this paper carry through even if we
have N I,m(i) = N for all i ∈ N , as in a complete information game. In other words,
the incomplete information feature of our game is permitted but not required for our
framework.
2.2. Predictions from Rationality
Each player chooses a strategy that maximizes his expected payoff according to his
beliefs. Given player i’s strategy, information set Ii, and his beliefs on the strategy of
other players si−i = (s
i
k)k∈N\{i}, the (interim) expected payoff of player i is defined as
Ui(si, s
i
−i; Ii) = E[ui(si(Ii), si−i(I−i), T, ηi)|Ii],
where si−i(I−i) = (sik(Ik))k∈N\{i}, I−i = ∨k 6=iIk and T = (Ti)i∈N . A best response sBRi of
player i corresponding to the strategies si−i of the other players as expected by player i is
such that for any linear strategy si,
Ui(s
BR
i , s
i
−i; Ii) ≥ Ui(si, si−i; Ii), a.e.
In order to generate predictions, one needs to deal with the beliefs in the model. There
are three approaches. The first approach is an equilibrium approach, where each player
believes that the other players’ strategies coincide with the actual strategies implemented
by the agents in equilibrium. The second approach, rationalizability, considers all strate-
gies that are rationalizable given some belief. The third approach is a behavioral ap-
proach where one considers a set of simple behavioral assumptions on the beliefs and
focuses on the best responses to these beliefs.
There are pros and cons among the three approaches. One of the main differences
between the equilibrium approach and the behavioral approach is that the former ap-
proach requires that the beliefs of all the players be ”correct” in equilibrium. However,
since each player i generally does not know who each of his GP -neighbors observes, a
Bayesian player in an incomplete information game with rational expectations would
need to know the distribution of the entire information graph GI (or at least have a com-
mon prior on the information graph commonly agreed upon by all the players) to form a
“correct” belief given his information. Given that the players are only partially observed
10
and GI is rarely observed with precision, producing a testable implication from such an
equilibrium model appears far from a trivial task.
The rationalizability approach can be used to relax this rational expectations assump-
tion by eliminating the requirement that the beliefs be correct. The approach considers all
the predictions that are rationalizable given some beliefs. However, the set of predictions
from rationalizability can potentially be large and may fail to produce sharp predictions
useful in practice.
This paper takes the approach of behavioral modeling. We adopt a set of simple be-
havioral assumptions on players’ beliefs which can be incorrect from the viewpoint of a
person with full knowledge of the distribution of the information graph, yet useful as a
rule-of-thumb guide for an agent in a complex decision-making environment such as the
one in our model. As we shall see later, this approach can give a sharp prediction that is
intuitive and analytically tractable.
2.3. Belief Projection and Best Responses
Let us introduce the following definition.
Definition 2.1. A player i does BP (Belief Projection), if she follows a linear strategy as:
si(Ii,0) =
∑
j∈NI(i)
T ′jwij + ηi,(2.3)
and believes that each of her GP -neighbors, say, k, plays a linear strategy as:
sik(Ik,0) =
∑
j∈NP (k)
T ′jw
i
kj + ηk,(2.4)
where the weights wikj satisfy that
(BP-a) wikk = wii,
(BP-b) wiki = wii/nP (k), and
(BP-c)
wikj =
{
wij if j ∈ NP (k) ∩NP (i)
κijwij if j ∈ NP (k) \NP (i),
for some constants −|β0|−1 < κij < |β0|−1.
Condition (2.4) assumes that player i believes that player k responds only to the types
of those players j ∈ NP (k). This is a rule of thumb for player i to form expectations about
player k without observing the set NI(k). If player i believes that the other players play a
linear strategy in (2.4), it is her best response to play a linear strategy as in (2.3).
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In forming beliefs about other players’ strategies, not knowing who they observe, BP
assumes that each player projects his own beliefs about himself and other players onto his
GP neighbors, as epitomized by Conditions (BP-a)-(BP-c). The ranking of weights wij
over j represents the relative strategic importance of player j to player i. When the
strategic importance of each player is based on some “vertical” characteristics such as
skills or assets of the agent j, it is not unreasonable to assume that such importance
applies to other players at least as a first benchmark.
More specifically, Condition (BP-a) says that each player i believes that the self-weight
his GP -neighbor k gives to himself is the same as the self-weight of player i. We can mod-
ify this assumption so that wikk = φikwii for a known factor φik. (See the Supplemental
Note.) Unless there is specific information to specify this factor, we suggest using the
simple choice φik = 1 as in Condition (BP-a).
Conditions (BP-b) and (BP-c) say that player i’s belief on his GP neighbor k’s weight
to player j is formed in reference to his own weight to player j. In other words, without
any information on who his GP -neighbors observe and how they rank other players,
each player simply takes himself as a benchmark to form beliefs about his GP neighbors’
ranking of other players. Condition (BP-b) reflects the notion that a player generally puts
more weight to his own type than to each of his GP -neighbors, and more so when his GP
neighbors are many. Condition (BP-c) says that the agent takes wikj to be wij but up to
a factor κij depending on whether j is an indirect GP -neighbor or a direct GP -neighbor.
For a best response to exist, player i cannot believe that his GP -neighbor k responds to
the types of j arbitrarily sensitively, which explains the constraint −|β0|−1 < κij < |β0|−1.
This constraint can be relaxed into one that takes a more complex form without changing
the main results of the paper. It turns out that the best responses of the players do not
depend on κij, and hence the econometrician does not need to specify κij for inference.7
Definition 2.2. (i) Player i ∈ N is said to be of simple type if she has information set Ii,0,
and does BP. Let Γ0 denote the game populated by n players who are of simple type and
have payoff functions in (2.1) and payoff graph GP .
(ii) Player i ∈ N is said to be of the first-order sophisticated type, if she has information
set Ii,1 and believes that the other players play the best response strategies from Γ0. Let
Γ1 denote the game populated by n players who are of the first-order sophisticated type
and have payoff functions in (2.1) and payoff graph GP .
7It is important to note that we do not impose BP directly on the strategies of the players as predicted
outcomes of the game. Instead, BP is used as an initial input for each player to form best response strategies
with limited information on networks. It is these best response strategies that constitute the predicted
outcomes from the game.
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The first-order sophisticated type agents are analogous to agents in level-k models in
behavioral economics. (See Chapter 5 of Camerer (2003) for a review.) In experiments, a
level-0 player chooses an action without considering strategic interactions, making them
much simpler than our simple types. Our simple-type player already considers strategic
interdependence and forms a best response. On the other hand, the level-k models allows
the agents to be of different orders of rationality within the same game. In our set-
up centered on observational data, identification of the unknown proportion of each
rationality type appears far from trivial. Hence in this paper, we consider a game where
all the agents have the same order of sophistication.8
Unlike the level-k models, the difference between the simple type and a sophisticated
type lies not only in the difference in their rationality type but also in the requirement for
the information set. A first-order sophisticated type agent knows who belongs to NP,3(i),
whereas a simple-type agent does not need to. The information set requirement for the
first-order sophisticated type agents is stronger than that for the simple-type agent.
Given the BP assumption, we can derive the following best responses which have intu-
itive appeal.
Theorem 2.1. Suppose that Assumptions 2.1 - 2.2 hold and for each i ∈ N and k 6= i,
E[ηk|Ii,0] = 0. Then each player i’s best response sBRi from game Γ0 takes the following form:
sBRi (Ii,0) = λii
γ′0Xi,1 + εi + β0nP (i) ∑
j∈NP (i)
λij(γ
′
0Xj,1 + εj)

+
1
nP (i)
∑
j∈NP (i)
λijδ
′
0Xj,2 + ηi,
where λij ≡ 1/(1− β0cij),
cij ≡ 1
nP (i)
∑
k∈NP (i)
1{j ∈ NP (k)}, if i 6= j, and(2.5)
cii ≡ 1
nP (i)
∑
k∈NP (i)
1
n¯P (k)
.
The behavioral strategies sBRi (Ii,0) maintain strategic interactions to be local around
each player’s GP -neighbors, regardless of the magnitude of β0, so that a player can have
8See Gillen (2010) and An (2017) for an application of level-k models to observational data from first-price
auctions. One of the major distinctions of our paper from theirs is that we focus on a set-up of a single large
game populated by many players occupying strategically heterogenous positions, whereas their research
centers on a set-up where the econometrician observes the same game played by a fixed number of agents
many times.
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a strong interaction with his GP -neighbors without being influenced by a change in the
type of a far-away player.9
Furthermore, the best response is intuitive in terms of network externality. The quan-
tity cij measures the proportion of player i’s GP -neighbors whose payoffs are influenced
by the type and action of player j. Hence cij represents the local centrality of player j to
player i. On the other hand, cii is the average of 1/nP (k) among player i’s GP -neighbors
k whose payoffs are affected by player i’s sharable type and action. For j ∈ NP (i),
∂sBRi (Ii,0)
∂xj,1
=
β0γ0
nP (i)(1− β0cii)(1− β0cij) and(2.6)
∂sBRi (Ii,0)
∂xj,2
=
δ0
nP (i)(1− β0cij) ,
both of which measure the response of actions of agent i to a change in the observed type
change of his GP -neighbors. Hence, these quantities capture the network externality in
the strategic interactions.
The network externality for agent i from a particular agent j decreases in nP (i). More
importantly, the network externality from one player to another is heterogeneous, de-
pending on each player’s “importance” to others in the payoff graph. This is seen from
the network externality (2.6) being an increasing function of agent j’s local centrality
to agent i, i.e., cij, when the game is that of strategic complements (i.e., β0 > 0). In
other words, the larger the fraction of agent i’s GP -neighbors whose payoff is affected by
agent j’s action, the higher the network externality of agent i from agent j’s type change
becomes. Therefore, in our model, network externality is heterogeneous across agents,
depending on the local feature of the payoff graph around each agent.
It is interesting to note that the network externality for agent i with respect to his own
type Xi,1 has a factor λii = 1/(1− β0cii) which is increasing in cii when β0 > 0. We call
1
1− β0cii − 1
the reflection effect which captures the way player i’s type affects his own action through
his GP neighbors whose payoffs are affected by player i’s types and actions. The reflec-
tion effect arises because each agent, in decision making, considers the fact that his type
affects other GP -neighbors’ decision making. When there is no payoff externality (i.e.,
β0 = 0), the reflection effect is zero. However, when there is a strong strategic interac-
tions or when a majority of player i’s GP -neighbors have a small GP -neighborhood (i.e.,
9This prediction is in contrast with that from the equilibrium strategies of a complete information version
of the game. According to the equilibrium strategies, the influence of one player can reach a far-away
player when β0 is high. See Section 2.4.
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small n¯(k) in the definition of cii in (2.5)), the reflection effect is large. Note that for
those agents whose cii the econometrician observes, the reflection effect is easily recov-
ered once one estimates the payoff externality β0.
Now let us turn to the case where the game is played by the first-order sophisticated
players.
Theorem 2.2. Suppose that Assumptions 2.1 - 2.2 hold and for each i ∈ N and k 6= i,
E[ηk|Ii,1] = 0. Then each player i’s best response sBR.FSi from game Γ1 takes the following
form:
sBR.FSi (Ii,1) = γ0Xi,1 + εi +
β0
nP (i)
∑
j∈NP (i)
λjj(γ
′
0Xj,1 + εj) + β
2
0
∑
j∈NP,2(i)
λ˜ij(γ
′
0Xj,1 + εj)
+ δ0X i,2 + δ
′
0β0
∑
j∈NP,2(i)
λ¯ijXj,2 + ηi,
where,
λ¯ij =
1
nP (i)
∑
k∈NP (i)
λkj1{j ∈ NP (k)}
nP (k)
, and
λ˜ij =
1
nP (i)
∑
k∈NP (i)
λkj1{j ∈ NP (k)}
nP (k)(1− β0ckk) .
As compared to game Γ0, game Γ1 predicts outcomes with broader network externality.
For example, the types of neighbors whose actions do not affect player i’s payoff can affect
his best response. More specifically, note that for j ∈ NP,2(i) \NP (i),
∂sBR.FSi (Ii,1)
∂xj,1
= β20γ0λ˜ij and
∂sBR.FSi (Ii,1)
∂xj,2
= β0δ0λij.
The externality from player j on player i is strong when player j has a high local centrality
ckj to a large fraction of player i’s GP -neighbors k.
2.4. Comparing Equilibrium Strategies and Behavioral Strategies
In this section, we compare the behavioral strategies (as best responses from the be-
havioral model) to the equilibrium strategies from a complete information game.10
10 Despite the parallel between the two approaches, it should be kept in mind that the behavioral model
naturally accommodates the case where one observes only part of the players whereas the complete infor-
mation game model does not in general.
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2.4.1. Convergence of Behavioral Strategies to Equilibrium Strategies. We assume
that ηi = 0, i.e., there is no private information, and show that as the information set ex-
pands and the order of sophistication becomes higher, the behavioral strategies converge
to the equilibrium strategies from a complete information game. We define the game Γm
and the m-th order sophisticated players by recursively applying the following definition
starting with m = 1 in Definition 2.2.
Definition 2.3. (i) For each m ≥ 1, each agent who has information set Ii,m and believes
that the other players play the best response strategies from game Γm−1 is said to be of
the m-th order sophisticated type.
(ii) Let Γm denote the game populated by n players who are of the m-th order sophis-
ticated type and have payoff functions in (2.1) and payoff graph GP .
Let Γ∞ be the game where players have the same payoff function and the same pay-
off graph as in Γm except that the players have complete information, i.e., each player
observes I = ((Xi, εi)i∈N , GP ). For each m = 1, 2, ..., let sBRm (Im) = (sBRi,m(Ii,m))i∈N be
the best response profile from the game denoted by Γm, and s∗(I) = (s∗i (I))i∈N be the
equilibrium strategy profile from the game Γ∞.
We first present in a lemma below the general form of best responses sBRm (Im) in terms
of linear weights, with the weights given by a recursive form. Let ai,ε be an n × 1 vector
having one in the i-th entry and zero in the other entries, ai,1 an n× dx1 matrix with the
(j, k)-element given as γk,01{i = j}, and ai,2 an n×dx2 matrix with the (j, k)-element given
as δk,01{j ∈ NP (i)}/nP (i). Furthermore, let Wi,(0),ε be an n× 1 vector with β0λiiλij1{j ∈
NP (i)}/nP (i) + 1{j = i}λii in the j-th entry, Wi,(0),1 an n × dx1 matrix with the (j, k)-
element given as
γk,0
(
β0
nP (i)
λiiλij1{j ∈ NP (i)}+ 1{j = i}λii
)
,
and Wi,(0),2 an n× dx2 matrix with the (j, k)-element given as δk,0λij1{j ∈ NP (i)}/nP (i).
For ` ∈ {ε, 1, 2}, and m = 0, 1, ..., we recursively define
Wi,(m+1),` = ai,` +
β0
nP (i)
∑
k∈NP (i)
Wk,(m),`.
Let X1 and X2 is the n × dx1 and n × dx2 matrices whose (i, k)-th entry is given by Xi,k,1
and Xi,k,2 respectively, where Xi,k,1 is the k-th entry of Xi,1 and Xi,k,2 the k-th entry of
Xi,2. The following lemma gives an explicit solution for sBRi,m(Ii,m).
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Lemma 2.1. For each m ≥ 0, the best response strategy si,m(Ii,m) of each agent i from the
game Γm is given by:
sBRi,m(Ii,m) = tr
(
Wi,(m),εε
′ +Wi,(m),2X ′1 +Wi,(m),2X
′
2
)
,(2.7)
where the weights Wi,(m),ε,Wi,(m),1,Wi,(m),2 are defined above.
The lemma shows that once β0 is fixed, the best response strategies are linear in pa-
rameters δ0, γ0. Now we are prepared to give a theorem below which shows that the
sequence of best response strategy profiles sBRm (Im) converges to the equilibrium strategy
s∗(I) from a complete information game Γ∞ as m→∞.
Theorem 2.3. Suppose that the conditions of Theorem 2.1 hold and that
max
i∈N
(
E[ε2i ] + E[‖Xi‖2]
)
<∞.(2.8)
Then, as m→∞,
E
[
max
i∈N
|sBRi,m(Ii,m)− s∗i (I)|2
]
→ 0.
Theorem 2.3 shows that as the order of sophistication deepens, the best response
strategies from the behavioral model become closer to the equilibrium strategies.
2.4.2. External Validity of Network Externality. We first compare the behavioral strate-
gies and equilibrium strategies in terms of how sensitively the network externality changes
as the network grows. If the sensitivity is not high, this supports the external validity of a
model toward a larger graph. The main focus here is on the stability of the prediction of
the network externalities as we progressively move from a small payoff graph to a large
payoff graph. Let Yi be the observed outcome of player i as predicted from either of the
two game models. For simplicity, we remove Xi’s and ηi’s.
The complete information game model assumes that every agent observes all the types
εi’s of other agents. The equilibrium constraint from this model yields:
Yi =
β0
nP (i)
∑
j∈NP (i)
Yj + εi,
where Yi denotes the action of player i in equilibrium. Then the reduced form for Yi’s can
be written as
y = (I − β0A)−1ε,
where y = (Y1, ..., Yn)′, ε = (ε1, ..., εn)′, and A is a row-normalized adjacency matrix of the
payoff graph GP , i.e., the (i, j)-th entry of A is 1/nP (i) if j ∈ NP (i) and zero otherwise.
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TABLE 1. The Characteristics of the Payoff Graphs
Erdo¨s-Re´nyi Baraba´si-Albert
Network A Network B Network C Network A Network B Network C
n 148.5 703.9 2878.2 204.6 1323.7 4192.5
dmx 10.90 12.84 14.34 63.04 106.4 122.2
dav 2.040 2.278 3.111 1.374 1.811 2.263
Notes: This table gives average characteristics of the payoff graphs, GP , used in the simulation study,
where the average was over 50 simulations. dav and dmx denote the average and maximum degrees of
the payoff graphs.
Thus when β0 is close to one (i.e., the local interaction becomes strong), the equilibrium
outcome can exhibit extensive cross-sectional dependence.
On the other hand, our behavioral model predicts the following:
Yi = λii
εi + β0
nP (i)
∑
j∈NP (i)
λijεj
 ,
which comes from Theorem 2.1 without Xi’s and ηi’s. For comparison purposes, we
introduce the average network externality (ANE):
1
n
∑
j∈N
∑
i∈N :i 6=j
∂sBRi (Ii)
∂εj
.(2.9)
The ANE measures the average impact of a change in the neighbors’ type on the actions
of the player. The ANE from equilibrium strategies of the complete information game is
1
n
∑
j∈N
∑
i∈N :i 6=j[(I − β0A)−1]ij, where [(I − β0A)−1]ij denotes the (i, j)-th entry of the
matrix (I − β0A)−1.
Network externalities depend only on β0 and the payoff graphGP . We consider average
of the ANE’s over simulated payoff graphs. For the payoff graph GP , we considered two
different models for random graph generation. The first kind of random graphs are
Erdo¨s-Re´nyi (ER) random graph with the probability equal to 5/n and the second kind
of random graphs are Baraba´si-Albert (BA) random graph such that beginning with an
Erdo¨s-Re´nyi random graph of size 20 with each link forming with equal probability 1/19
and grows by including each new node with two links formed with the existing nodes
with probability proportional to the degree of the nodes.
For each random graph, we first generate a random graph of size 10,000, and then
construct three subgraphs A,B,C such that network A is a subgraph of network B and
the network B is a subgraph of network C. We generate these subgraphs as follows. First,
we take a subgraph A to be one that consists of agents within distance k from agent i = 1.
Then network B is constructed to be one that consists of the neighbors of the agents in
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FIGURE 1. The Average Network Externality Comparison Between Equilibrium
and Behavioral Models: Erdo¨s-Re´nyi Graphs
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Notes: Each line represents the average network externality (ANE) as a function of β0. Each panel shows
multiple lines representing ANE as we expand the graph from a subgraph of agents within distance k
from the agent 1. (Networks A, B, and C correspond to networks with k = 3, 4, 5 from a small graph
to a large one.) The figures show that the ANE is stable across different networks, and that the ANE
from the behavioral model converges to that from the equilibrium model as the order of sophistication
becomes higher.
network A and network C is constructed to be one that consists of the neighbors of the
agents in network B. For an ER random graph, we took k = 3 and for a BA random
graph, we took k = 2. We repeated the process 50 times to construct an average behavior
of network externality as we increase the network. Table 1 shows the average network
sizes and degree characteristics as we move from Networks A, B to C.
The ANEs from the equilibrium strategies from game Γ∞, and the behavioral strategies
from games Γm as m becomes higher are shown in Figures 1 and 2. First, as m becomes
larger, the ANEs from Γ∞ and those from Γm get closer, as predicted by Theorem 2.3.
Furthermore, the ANEs from the behavioral model are similar to that from the equilibrium
model especially when β0 is between −0.5 and 0.5. Also, the ANE does not exhibit much
change (except for when β0 is extremely high or low) as we move from a small graph to
a large graph.
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FIGURE 2. The Average Network Externality Comparison Between Equilibrium
and Behavioral Models: Baraba´si-Albert Graphs
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Notes: Each line represents the average network externality (ANE) as a function of β0. Each panel shows
multiple lines representing ANE as we expand the graph from a subgraph of agents within distance k
from the agent 1. (Networks A, B, and C correspond to networks with k = 2, 3, 4 from a small graph to
a large one.)
Suppose that the econometrician believes the true model is an equilibrium model, but
uses our behavioral model as a proxy for the equilibrium model. If these two models gen-
erate “similar” predictions, using our behavioral model as a proxy will not be a bad idea.
The results in Figures 1 and 2 show that the answer depends on the payoff externality
β0. As long as β0 is within (−0.5, 0.5), both the equilibrium approach and the behavioral
approach give similar network externality. However, the discrepancy widens when β0 is
high. Hence in this set-up, using our behavioral approach as a proxy for an equilibrium
approach makes sense only when strategic interdependence is not too high.
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3. Econometric Inference
3.1. General Overview
3.1.1. Partial Observation of Interactions. A large network data set is often obtained
through a non-random sampling process. (See e.g. Kolaczyk (2009).) The main difficulty
in practice is that the actual sampling process of network data is hard to mathematically
formulate with accuracy. Our approach of empirical modeling can be useful in such a
situation where interactions are observed only partially through a certain non-random
sampling scheme that is not precisely known. In this section, we make explicit the data
requirements for the econometrician and propose inference procedures. We mainly focus
on the game where all the players in the game are of simple type. Later, we discuss the
situation with agents of first-order sophisticated type.
Suppose that the original game of interactions consists of a large number of agents
whose set we denote by N . Let the set of players N be on a payoff graph GP and an
information graph GI , facing the strategic environment as described in the preceding
section. Denote the best response as an observed dependent variable Yi: for i ∈ N ,
Yi = s
BR
i (Ii,0).
Let us make the following additional assumption on this original large game. Let us first
define
F = σ(X,GP , GI) ∨ C,
i.e., the σ-field generated by X = (Xi)i∈N , GP , GI and C is a given common shock which
is to be explained below.
Assumption 3.1. (i) εi’s and ηi’s are conditionally i.i.d. across i’s given F .
(ii) {εi}ni=1 and {ηi}ni=1 are conditionally independent given F .
(iii) For each i ∈ N , E[εi|F ] = 0 and E[ηi|F ] = 0.
Condition (i) excludes pre-existing cross-sectional dependence of unobserved hetero-
geneity in the payoffs once conditioned in F . This condition implies that conditional on
F , the cross-sectional dependence of observed actions is solely due to the information
sharing among the agents. Condition (ii) requires that conditional on F , the unobserved
payoff heterogeneities observed by other players and those that are private are indepen-
dent. Condition (iii) excludes endogenous formation of GP or GI , because the condition
requires that the unobserved type components εi and ηi be conditionally mean indepen-
dent of these graphs, given X = (Xi)i∈N and C. However, the condition does not exclude
the possibility that GP and GI are exogenously formed based on (X, C). For example,
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suppose that ij ∈ EP if and only if
fij(Xi, Xj, ai, aj, uij) ≥ 0,
where ai represents degree heterogeneity, uij ’s errors, and fij a given nonstochastic func-
tion. In this set-up, the econometrician does not observe ai’s or uij ’s. This nests the dyadic
regression model of Graham (2017) as a special case. Condition (iii) accommodates such
a set-up, as long as {ai}ni=1 and {uij}ni,j=1 are conditionally independent of {εi}ni=1 and
{ηi}ni=1 given X. One simply has to take C to contain ai’s and uij ’s.
The econometrician observes only a subset N∗ ⊂ N of agents and part of GP through
a potentially stochastic sampling process of unknown form. We assume for simplicity
that n∗ ≡ |N∗| is nonstochastic. This assumption is satisfied, for example, if one collects
the data for agents with predetermined sample size n∗. We assume that though being
a small fraction of N , the set N∗ is still a large set justifying our asymptotic framework
that sends n∗ to infinity. Most importantly, constituting only a small fraction of N , the
observed sampleN∗ of agents induces a payoff subgraph which one has no reason to view
as “approximating” or “similar to” the original payoff graph GP . Let us make precise the
data requirements.
Condition A: The stochastic elements of the sampling process are conditionally indepen-
dent of {(T ′i , ηi)′}i∈N given F .
Condition B: For each i ∈ N∗, the econometrician observes NP (i) and (Yi, Xi), and for
each j ∈ NP (i), the econometrician observes |NP (i) ∩NP (j)|, nP (j) and Xj.
Condition C: Either of the following two conditions is satisfied:
(a) For i, j ∈ N∗ such that i 6= j, NP (i) ∩NP (j) = ∅.
(b) For each agent i ∈ N∗, and for any agent j ∈ N∗ such that NP (i) ∩NP (j) 6= ∅, the
econometrician observes Yj, |NP (j) ∩NP (k)|, nP (k) and Xk for all k ∈ NP (j).
Before we discuss the conditions, it is worth noting that these conditions are trivially
satisfied when we observe the full payoff graph GP and N∗ = N . Condition A is satisfied,
for example, if the sampling process is based on observed characteristics X and some
characteristics of the strategic environment that is commonly observed by all the players.
This condition is violated if the sampling is based on the outcomes Yi’s or unobserved
payoff-relevant signals such as εi or ηi. Condition B essentially requires that in the data
set, we observe (Yi, Xi) of many agents i, and for each GP -neighbor j of agent i, observe
the number of the agents who are common GP -neighbors of i and j and the size of GP -
neighborhood of j along with the observed characteristics Xj.11 As for a GP -neighbor j
11Note that this condition is violated when the neighborhoods are top-coded in practice. For example, the
maximum number of friends in the survey for a peer effects study can be set to be lower than the actual
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of agent i ∈ N∗, this condition does not require that the agent j’s action Yi or the full set
of his GP -neighbors are observed. Condition C(a) is typically satisfied when the sample
of agents N∗ is randomly selected from a much larger set of agents so that no two agents
have overlapping GP -neighbors in the sample.12 In practice for use in inference, one can
take the set N∗ to include only those agents that satisfy Conditions A-C as long as N∗
thereof is still large and the selection is based only on (X,GP ). One can simply use only
those agents whose GP -neighborhoods are not overlapping, as long as there are many
such agents in the data.
3.1.2. Estimating Payoff Parameters and the Average Network Externality. In order
to introduce inference procedures for β0 and other payoff parameters, let us define for
i ∈ N ,
Zi,1 = λiiXi,1 +
β0λii
nP (i)
∑
j∈NP (i)
λijXj,1, and(3.1)
Zi,2 =
1
nP (i)
∑
j∈NP (i)
λijXj,2.
(Note that Zi,1 and Zi,2 rely on β0 although it is suppressed from notation for simplicity
as we do frequently below for other quantities.) By Theorem 2.1, we can write
Yi = Z
′
i,1γ0 + Z
′
i,2δ0 + vi,
where
vi = λiiεi +
β0λii
nP (i)
∑
j∈NP (i)
λijεj + ηi.
Note that the observed actions Yi are cross-sectionally dependent (conditional on Xi’s)
due to information sharing on unobservables εi. However, since only the types of GP -
neighbors turn out to be relevant in the best response, the correlation between Yi and Yj
is non-zero only when agents i and j are GP -neighbors.
We define Zi = [Z ′i,1, Z
′
i,2]
′ ∈ Rdx1+dx2 and ρ0 = [γ′0, δ′0]′ ∈ Rdx1+dx2 , where Xi,1 ∈ Rdx1
and Xi,2 ∈ Rdx2 , so that we can rewrite the linear model as
Yi = Z
′
iρ0 + vi.
number of friends for many students. The impact of this top-coding upon the inference procedure is an
interesting question on its own which deserves exploration in a separate paper.
12This random selection does not need to be a random sampling from the population of agents. Note that
the random sampling is extremely hard to implement in practice in this situation, because one needs to
use the equal probability for selecting each agent into the collection N∗, but this equal probability will be
feasible only when one has at least the catalog of the entire population N .
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Suppose that ϕi is M × 1 vector of instrumental variables (which potentially depend on
β0) with M > d ≡ dx1 + dx2 such that for all i ∈ N ,
E[viϕi] = 0.
Note that the orthogonality condition above holds for any ϕi as long as for each i ∈ N ,
ϕi is F -measurable, i.e., once F is realized, there is no extra randomness in ϕi. This is
the case, for example, when ϕi is a function of X = (Xi)i∈N . We also allow that each ϕi
depends on β0.13
While the asymptotic validity of our inference procedure admits a wide range of choices
for ϕi’s, one needs to choose them with care to obtain sharp inference on the payoff pa-
rameters. Especially, it is important to consider instrumental variables which involve the
characteristics of GP -neighbors to obtain sharp inference on payoff externality parame-
ter β0. This is because the cross-sectional dependence of observations carries substantial
information for estimating strategic interdependence among agents.
The moment function is nonlinear in the payoff externality β0 and it is not easy to
ensure that these moment conditions uniquely determine the true parameter vector even
in the limit as n∗ goes to infinity.14 In this paper, we adopt a Bonferroni procedure in
which we first obtain a confidence interval for β0 and, using this, we perform inference
on ρ0. This approach works well even when β0 is not consistently estimable.
We proceed first to estimate ρ0 assuming knowledge of β0. Define
Sϕϕ = ϕ
′ϕ/n∗, and ϕ˜ = ϕS−1/2ϕϕ
where ϕ is an n∗ ×M matrix whose i-th row is given by ϕ′i, i ∈ N∗. Define
Λ =
1
n∗
∑
i∈N∗
∑
j∈N∗
E[vivj|F ]ϕ˜iϕ˜′j,(3.2)
where ϕ˜i represents the transpose of the i-th row of ϕ˜, and let Λˆ be a consistent estimator
of Λ. (We will explain how we construct this estimator later.) Define
SZϕ˜ = Z
′ϕ˜/n∗, and Sϕ˜y = ϕ˜′y/n∗,
13A standard identification analysis centers on a “representative probability” from which we observe i.i.d.
draws. A parameter is identified if it is uniquely determined for each representative probability which
is consistently estimable by the Law of the Large Numbers. However, in our set-up, there is no such
probability. Instead, we have a triangular array of observations that are heterogeneously distributed and
cross-sectionally dependent in a complex way. We doubt that taking the joint distribution of n-observations
as the “representive probability” for identification analysis is useful, when such a probability is not consis-
tently estimable. Thus, we directly focus on asymptotic validity of inference in this paper.
14One might consider following the nonlinear iterated least squares approach of Blundell and Robin
(1999). However, it is not clear in our context whether the parameter β0 is consistently estimable across
various payoff graph configurations as n∗ diverges to infinity. Thus, this paper takes a Bonferroni approach.
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where Z is an n∗× d matrix whose i-th row is given by Z ′i and y is an n∗× 1 vector whose
i-th entry is given by Yi, i ∈ N∗. Since (from the fact that GP is undirected)
cij =
|NP (i) ∩NP (j)|
nP (i)
,
we can construct Zi for each i ∈ N∗ from the data satisfying Conditions A-C. Then we
estimate
ρˆ =
[
SZϕ˜Λˆ
−1S ′Zϕ˜
]−1
SZϕ˜Λˆ
−1Sϕ˜y.(3.3)
Using this estimator, we construct a vector of residuals vˆ = [vˆi]i∈N∗, where
vˆi = Yi − Z ′iρˆ.(3.4)
Finally, we form a profiled test statistic as follows:
T (β0) =
vˆ′ϕ˜Λˆ−1ϕ˜′vˆ
n∗
,(3.5)
making it explicit that the test statistic depends on β0. Later we show that
T (β0)→d χ2M−d, as n∗ →∞,
where χ2M−d denotes the χ
2 distribution with degree of freedom M − d. Let Cβ1−α be the
(1− α)100% confidence set for β0 defined as
Cβ1−α ≡ {β ∈ (−1, 1) : T (β) ≤ c1−α},
where T (β) is computed as T (β0) with β0 replaced by β and the critical value c1−α is the
(1− α)-quantile of χ2M−d.
Let us now construct a confidence set for ρ0. First, we establish that under regularity
conditions,
√
n∗Vˆ −1/2(ρˆ− ρ0)→d N(0, I),
as n∗ →∞, where
Vˆ =
[
SZϕ˜Λˆ
−1S ′Zϕ˜
]−1
.
(See Section 3.2 below for conditions and formal results.) Using this estimator ρˆ, we can
construct a (1 − α)100% confidence interval for a′ρ0 for any non-zero vector a. For this
define
σˆ2(a) = a′Vˆ a.
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Let ca1−(α/4) be the (1 − (α/4))-percentile of N(0, 1). Define for a vector a with the same
dimension as ρ,
Cρ1−(α/2)(β0, a) =
[
a′ρˆ− c
a
1−(α/4)σˆ(a)√
n
, a′ρˆ+
ca1−(α/4)σˆ(a)√
n
]
.
Then the confidence set for a′ρ is given by15
Cρ1−α(a) =
⋃
β∈Cβ
1−(α/2)
Cρ1−(α/2)(β, a).
Notice that since β runs in (−1, 1) and the estimator ρˆ has an explicit form, the confidence
interval is not computationally costly to construct in general.
Often the eventual parameter of interest is one that captures how strongly the agents’s
decisions are interdependent through the network. For this, we can use the average
network externality (ANE) introduced in (2.9). Let sBRi (Ii,0) be the best response of agent
i having information set Ii. Then the ANE with respect to Xi,1,r (where Xi,1,r represents
the r-th entry of Xi,1) is given by θ1(β0, γ0,r), where
θ1(β0, γ0,r) =
1
n∗
∑
i∈N∗
∑
j∈NP (i)
∂sBRi (Ii,0)
∂xj,1,r
=
1
n∗
∑
i∈N∗
∑
j∈NP (i)
β0
nP (i)(1− β0cii)(1− β0cij)γ0,r,
where γ0,r denotes the r-th entry of γ0. See (2.6). Thus the confidence interval for
θ1(β0, γ0) can be constructed from the confidence interval for β0 and γ0 as follows:
Cθ11−α =
{
θ1(β, γr) : β ∈ Cβ1−α/2, and γr ∈ Cγr1−α/2
}
,
where Cβ1−α/2 and C
γr
1−α/2 denote the (1 − α/2)100% confidence intervals for β0 and γ0,r
respectively. We can define similarly the average network externality with respect to an
entry of Xi,2 and construct a confidence interval for it. Details are omitted.
3.1.3. Downweighting Players with High Degree Centrality. When there are players
who are linked to many other players in GP , the graph GP tends to be denser, and it
becomes difficult to obtain good variance estimators that perform stably in finite samples.
(In particular, obtaining an estimator of Λ in (3.2) which performs well in finite samples
can be difficult.) To remedy this situation, this paper proposes a downweighting of those
15Instead of the Bonferroni approach here, one could consider a profiling approach where one uses T (ρ) =
supβ T (β, ρ) as the test statistic, where T (β, ρ) is the test statistic constructed using ρ in place of ρˆ. The
profiling approach is cumbersome to use here beause one needs to simulate the limiting distribution of
T (ρ) for each ρ, which can be computationally complex when the dimension of ρ is large. Instead, this
paper’s Bonferroni approach is simple to use because β0 takes values from (−1, 1).
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players with high degree centrality in GP . More specifically, in choosing an instrument
vector ϕi, we may consider the following:
ϕi(X) =
1√
n¯P (i)
gi(X),(3.6)
where gi(X) is a function of X. This choice of ϕi downweights players i who have a
large GP -neighborhood. Thus we rely less on the variations of the characteristics of those
players who have many neighbors in GP .
Downweighting agents too heavily may hurt the power of inference because the ac-
tions of agents with high centrality contain information about the parameter of interest
through the moment restrictions. On the other hand, downweighting them too lightly
will hurt the finite sample stability of inference due to strong cross-sectional dependence
they cause to the observations. Since a model with agents of higher-order sophisticated
type results in observations with more extensive cross-sectional dependence, the role of
downweighting can be prominent in securing finite sample stability in such a model.
3.1.4. Comparison with Linear-in-Means Models. Among the frequently used interac-
tion models in the econometrics literature is a linear-in-means model specified as follows:
Yi = X
′
i,1γ0 +X
′
i,2δ0 + β0µ
e
i (Y i) + vi,(3.7)
where µei (Y i) denotes the player i’s expectation of Y i, and
Y i =
1
nP (i)
∑
j∈NP (i)
Yj and X i =
1
nP (i)
∑
j∈NP (i)
Xj.
The literature assumes rational expectations by equating µei (Y i) to E[Y i|Ii], and then
proceeds to identification analysis of parameters γ, δ0 and β0. For actual inference, one
needs to use an estimated version of E[Y i|Ii]. One standard way in the literature is to
replace it by Y i so that we have
Yi = X
′
i,1γ0 +X
′
i,2δ0 + β0Y i + v˜i,
where v˜i is an error term defined as v˜i = β0(E[Y i|Ii] − Y i) + vi. The complexity arises
due to the presence of Y i which is an endogneous variable that is involved in the error
term v˜i.16
As for dealing with endogeneity, there are two kinds of instrumental variables proposed
in the literature. The first kind is a peers-of-peers type instrumental variable which is
based on the observed characteristics of the neighbors of the neighbors. This strategy was
16A similar observation applies in the case of a complete information version of the model, where one
directly uses Y i in place of µei (Y i) in (3.7). Still due to simultaneity of the equations, Y i necessarily
involve error terms vi not only of agent i’s own but other agents’ as well.
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proposed by Kelejian and Robinson (1993), Bramoulle´, Djebbari, and Fortin (2009) and
De Giorgi, Pellizzari, and Redaelli (2010). The second kind of an instrumental variable is
based on observed characteristics excluded from the group characteristics as instrumental
variables. (See Brock and Durlauf (2001) and Durlauf and Tanaka (2008).) However,
finding such an instrumental variable in practice is not always a straightforward task in
empirical research.
Our approach of empirical modeling is different in several aspects. Our modeling uses
behavioral assumptions instead of rational expectations, and produces a reduced form
for observed actions Yi from using best responses. This reduced form gives a rich set
of testable implications and makes explicit the source of cross-sectional dependence in
relation to the payoff graph. Our approach permits any nontrivial functions of F as
instrumental variables at least for the validity of inference. Furthermore, one does not
need to observe many independent interactions for inference.
3.1.5. Estimation of Asymptotic Covariance Matrix. One needs to find an estimator Vˆ
to perform inference. First, let us find the population version of Vˆ . After some algebra, it
is not hard to see that the population version (conditional on F) of Vˆ is given by
V =
[
SZϕ˜Λ
−1S ′Zϕ˜
]−1
.(3.8)
For estimation, it suffices to estimate Λ defined in (3.2). For this, we need to incor-
porate the cross-sectional dependence of the residuals vi properly. From the definition
of vi, it turns out that vi and vj can be correlated if i and j are connected indirectly
through two edges in GP . However, constructing an estimator of Λ simply by imposing
this dependence structure and replacing vi by vˆi can result in a conservative estimator
with unstable finite sample properties, especially when each player has many players
connected through two edges. Instead, this paper proposes an alternative estimator of Λ
as follows.
Fixing a value for β0, we first obtain a first-step estimator of ρ as follows:
ρ˜ =
[
SZϕ˜S
′
Zϕ˜
]−1
SZϕ˜Sϕ˜y.(3.9)
Using this estimator, we construct a vector of residuals v˜ = [v˜i]i∈N∗, where
v˜i = Yi − Z ′iρ˜.(3.10)
Then we estimate17
Λˆ = Λˆ1 + Λˆ2,
17Under Condition C(a) for sample N∗, we have Λ2 = 0 because the second sum in the expression for Λ2
is empty. Hence in this case, we can simply set Λˆ2 = 0.
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where
Λˆ1 =
1
n∗
∑
i∈N∗
v˜2i ϕ˜iϕ˜
′
i, and
Λˆ2 =
sˆε
n∗
∑
i∈N∗
∑
j∈N∗−i:NP (i)∩NP (j)6=∅
qε,ijϕ˜iϕ˜
′
j,
and
sˆε =
∑
i∈N∗
∑
j∈NP (i)∩N∗
v˜iv˜j∑
i∈N∗
∑
j∈NP (i)∩N∗
qε,ij
,(3.11)
qε,ij =
λjiλiiλjj1{i ∈ NP (j)}
nP (j)
+
λijλiiλjj1{j ∈ NP (i)}
nP (i)
+
β0λiiλjj
nP (i)nP (j)
∑
k∈NP (i)∩NP (j)
λikλjk.
(Note that the quantity qε,ij can be evaluated once β0 is fixed.) Using Λˆ, we construct the
estimator for the covariance matrix V , i.e.,
Vˆ =
[
SZϕ˜Λˆ
−1S ′Zϕ˜
]−1
.(3.12)
Later we provide conditions for the estimator to be consistent for V .18
3.2. Asymptotic Theory
In this section, we present the assumptions and formal results of asymptotic inference.
We introduce some technical conditions.
Assumption 3.2. There exists c > 0 such that for all n∗ ≥ 1, λmin(Sϕϕ) ≥ c, λmin(SZϕ˜S ′Zϕ˜) ≥
c, λmin(SZϕ˜Λ−1S ′Zϕ˜) ≥ c, λmin(Λ) ≥ c, σ2η > 0, and
1
n∗
∑
i∈N∗
λii
nP (i)
∑
j∈NP (i)∩N∗
λij > c,
where λmin(A) for a symmetric matrix A denotes the minimum eigenvalue of A.
18 In finite samples, Vˆ is not guaranteed to be positive definite. We can modify the estimator by using
spectral decomposition similarly as in Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller (2011). More specifically, we first
take a spectral decomposition Vˆ = BˆAˆBˆ′, where Aˆ is a diagonal matrix of eigenvalues aˆj of Vˆ . We replace
each aˆj by the maximum between aˆj and some small number c > 0 in Aˆ to construct Aˆ∗. Then the modified
version V˜ ≡ BˆAˆ∗Bˆ′ is positive definite. For c > 0, taking c = 0.005 seems to work well in the simulation
studies.
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Assumption 3.3. There exists a constant C > 0 such that for all n∗ ≥ 1,
max
i∈N◦
||Xi||+ max
i∈N◦
||ϕ˜i|| ≤ C
and E[ε4i |F ] + E[η4i |F ] < C, where n◦ = |N◦| and
N◦ =
⋃
i∈N∗
NP (i).
Assumption 3.2 is used to ensure that the asymptotic distribution is nondegenerate.
This regularity condition is reasonable, because an asymptotic scheme that gives a de-
generate distribution would not be adequate for approximating a finite sample, nonde-
generate distribution of an estimator. Assumption 3.3 can be weakened at the expense of
complexity in the conditions and the proofs.
We introduce an assumption which requires the payoff graph to have a bounded degree
over i in the observed sample N∗.
Assumption 3.4. There exists C > 0 such that for all n∗ ≥ 1,
max
i∈N∗
|NP (i)| ≤ C.
We may relax the assumption to a weaker, yet more complex condition at the expense
of longer proofs, but in our view, this relaxation does not give additional insights. When
N∗ is large, one can remove very high-degree nodes to obtain stable inference. As such
removal is solely based on the payoff graphGP , the removal does not lead to any violation
of the conditions in the paper.
The following theorem establishes the asymptotic validity of inference based on the
best responses in Theorem 2.1. The proof is found in the Supplemental Note to this
paper.
Theorem 3.1. Suppose that the conditions of Theorem 2.1 and Assumptions 3.1 - 3.4 hold.
Then,
T (β0)→d χ2M−d, and Vˆ −1/2
√
n∗ (ρˆ− ρ0)→d N(0, I),
as n∗ →∞.
3.3. Inference for the Model with First Order Sophisticated Agents
3.3.1. Inference on Parameters. Let us consider inference on payoff parameters using
a model that assumes all the agents to be of first-order sophisticated type. The network
externality is more extensive than when the agents are of simple type, and best responses
involve more extensive network externality, and we require more data accordingly. In
particular, we strengthen Conditions B and C as follows:
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Condition B1: For each i ∈ N∗, the econometrician observes NP,2(i) and (Yi, Xi) and
for any j ∈ NP (i) and any k ∈ NP,2(i)\NP (i), the econometrician observes nP (j), nP (k),
|NP (i) ∩NP (j)| and |NP (j) ∩NP (k)|, Xj and Xk.
Condition C1: Either of the following two conditions is satisfied.
(a) For any i, j ∈ N∗ such that i 6= j, NP,2(i) ∩NP,2(j) = ∅.
(b) For each agent i ∈ N∗, and for any agent j ∈ N∗ such that NP,2(i) ∩ NP,2(j) 6= ∅,
the econometrician observes Yj, |NP,2(j) ∩NP,2(k)|, nP (k) and Xk for all k ∈ NP (j).
Condition B1 requires that the data contain many agents such that NP,2(i) for each i
of such agents is available together with the number of common GP -neighbors between
each agent k ∈ NP,2(i) and agent i and between each agent j ∈ NP (i) and agent i. Condi-
tion C1 is again trivially satisfied if data contain many agents such that GP -neighbors of
GP -neighbors do not overlap. In this case, we can select N∗ to include only those agents.
The inference is similar as in the case with agents of simple type, except that we re-
define Zi,1, Zi,2, and vi into ZFSi,1 , Z
FS
i,2 , and v
FS
i as we explain below. In this subsection,
we explain the inference procedure briefly, and relegate the conditions and the formal
results of asymptotic validity to the Supplemental Note to save space. Define
ZFSi,1 = Xi,1 +
β0
nP (i)
∑
j∈NP (i)
λjjXj,1 + β
2
0
∑
j∈NP,2(i)
λ˜ijXj,1, and(3.13)
ZFSi,2 = X i,2 + β0
∑
j∈NP,2(i)
λ¯ijXj,2.
Then, by the previous results, we can write
Yi = Z
FS′
i,1 γ0 + Z
FS′
i,2 δ0 + v
FS
i(3.14)
= ZFS
′
i ρ0 + v
FS
i ,
where ZFSi = [Z
FS′
i,1 , Z
FS′
i,1 ]
′ and
vFSi = R
FS
i (ε) + ηi,
with
RFSi (ε) = εi +
β0
nP (i)
∑
j∈NP (i)
λjjεj + β
2
0
∑
j∈NP,2(i)
λ˜ijεj.
Using this reformulation, we can develop inference similarly as before. More specifically,
let us define
ΛFS =
1
n∗
∑
i∈N∗
∑
j∈N∗
E[vFSi v
FS
j |F ]ϕ˜iϕ˜′j,(3.15)
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and let ΛˆFS be a consistent estimator of ΛFS. (The construction is done in a way similar to
Λˆ. We explain its construction in detail in the Supplemental Note to this paper.) Define
ρˆFS as we constructed ρˆ in (3.3) except that we replace Z and Λˆ by ZFS and ΛˆFS, and
construct vˆFSi as we constructed vˆi in (3.4) except that we replace Z and ρˆ by Z
FS and
ρˆFS. Thus, we define T FS as we defined T in (3.5) using vˆFSi and Λˆ
FS in place of vˆi and Λˆ
and confidence intervals
{β ∈ (−1, 1) : T FS(β) ≤ c1−α},
where c1−α is the (1− α)-quantile of χ2M−d.
The confidence intervals for a′ρ can be similarly constructed as in Section 3.1.2. using
ZFS and ΛˆFS in place of Z and Λˆ. More specifically, define
ρˆFS =
[
SFSZϕ˜(Λˆ
FS)−1(SFSZϕ˜)
′
]−1
SFSZϕ˜(Λˆ
FS)−1SFSϕ˜y ,(3.16)
where SFSZϕ˜ and S
FS
ϕ˜y are the same as S
FS
Zϕ˜ and S
FS
ϕ˜y except that we use Z
FS in place of Z.
Using this, we construct the estimator
Vˆ FS =
[
SFSZϕ˜(Λˆ
FS)−1SFSϕ˜Z
]−1
.(3.17)
One can use these estimators for inference on β0 and ρ0 as previously explained.
3.4. Model Selection between Γ0 and Γ1
It is a matter of econometric model specification to choose between Γ0 with simple-type
agents or Γ1 with the first-order sophisticated type agents as an empirical model. Both
models are distinct and nonnested. Here we provide an empirical procedure to select
among the two models.
First, we write vi(β0), vFSi (β0), and ϕ˜i(β0) in place of vi, v
FS
i , and ϕ˜i to make their
dependence on β0 explicit. Let B be a set contained in (−1, 1) and assumed to contain
the true parameter β0, and define
TST = inf
β∈B
T (β), and TFS = inf
β∈B
T FS(β),
where T (β0) is as defined in (3.5) and T FS(β0) is similarly defined after (3.15). Then, we
consider the set
Sˆ = {s ∈ {ST,FS} : Ts ≤ c1−α/2},
where c1−α/2 denotes the (1−α/2)-percentile of the distribution of χ2M−d. Among the two
models based on games Γ0 and Γ1, the set Sˆ is the set of the models that are not rejected
at 100(1− α)% in the sense to be explained below.
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Define
mST = inf
β∈B
∣∣∣∣∣ 1n∗ ∑
i∈N∗
E [vi(β)|F ] ϕ˜i(β)
∣∣∣∣∣ , and
mFS = inf
β∈B
∣∣∣∣∣ 1n∗ ∑
i∈N∗
E
[
vFSi (β)|F
]
ϕ˜i(β)
∣∣∣∣∣ .
Let S0 = {s ∈ {ST,FS} : ms = 0}. Hence S0 denotes the collection of true models (as
distinguished by the moment condition ms = 0, s ∈ {ST,FS}.) Let Pn be the collection of
the joint distributions of all the observables in the data. For each δ > 0, let us define
Pn,1(δ) = {P ∈ Pn : mST = 0,mFS > δ}
Pn,2(δ) = {P ∈ Pn : mST > δ,mFS = 0}
Pn,3(δ) = {P ∈ Pn : mST = 0,mFS = 0}, and
Pn,4(δ) = {P ∈ Pn : mST > δ,mFS > δ},
and define
Pn(δ) =
4⋃
k=1
Pn,k(δ).
Then, the selection rule Sˆ can be justified as follows: for each δ > 0,
lim inf
n→∞
inf
P∈Pn(δ)
P{S0 = Sˆ} ≥ 1− α.
Due to the space constraints, the conditions and the proof of this result are given in the
Supplemental Note. We can also make the selection rule a consistent selection rule, by
choosing α = αn to be a sequence so that c1−αn/2 →∞ but slowly at a proper rate.
The procedure can be modified to perform model selection with other combinations
of the models as long as a testing procedure for moment conditions from each model
is available. For example, suppose that mEQ = 0 is a moment condition for a complete
information game model with equilibrium strategies and a consistent testing procedure
(at level α) for this moment condition is given by 1{TEQ > cEQ1−α} for some test statistic
TEQ and critical value cEQ1−α. Then, one can replace TFS and c1−α/2 by TEQ and c
EQ
1−α/2 in
the previous procedure to select a set of models from {ST,EQ} that are not rejected at
100(1− α)%.
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4. A Monte Carlo Simulation Study
In this section, we investigate the finite sample properties of the asymptotic inference
across various configurations of the payoff graph, GP , for the case of simple types. (We
present Monte Carlo simulation results for the first-order sophisticated types, using the
inference procedure developed in the previous section, in Appendix E in the Supplemen-
tal Note.) The payoff graphs are generated according to two models of random graph
formation, which we call Specifications 1 and 2. Specification 1 uses the Baraba´si-Albert
model of preferential attachment, with m representing the number of edges each new
node forms with existing nodes. The number m is chosen from {1, 2, 3}. Specification 2
is the Erdo¨s-Re´nyi random graph with probability p = λ/n, where λ is also chosen from
{1, 2, 3}.19 In the first table, we report degree characteristics of the payoff graphs used in
the simulation study.
For the simulations, we also set the following: ρ0 = (γ′0, δ
′
0)
′, with γ0 = (2, 4, 1)′, and
δ0 = (3, 4)
′. We choose a to be a vector of ones so that a′ρ0 = 14. The variables ε and
η are drawn i.i.d. from N(0, 1). The first column of Xi,1 is a column of ones, while the
remaining columns of Xi,1 are drawn independently from N(1, 1). The columns of Xi,2
are drawn independently from N(3, 1).
For instruments, we consider the following nonlinear transformations of X1 and X2:
ϕi = [Z˜i,1, X
2
i,1, X
2
i,2, X
3
i,2]
′,
where we define
Z˜i,1 ≡ 1
nP (i)
∑
j∈NP (i)
λijXj,1.
We generate Yi from the best response function in Theorem 2.1. While the instruments
X2i,1, X
2
i,2, X
3
i,2 capture the nonlinear impact of Xi’s, the instrument Z˜i,1 captures the cross-
sectional dependence along the payoff graph. The use of this instrumental variable in
crucial in obtaining a sharp inference for β0. Note that since we have already concen-
trated out ρ in forming the moment conditions, we cannot use linear combinations of
Xi,1 and Xi,2 as our instrumental variables. The nominal size in all the experiments is set
at α = 0.05.
Overall, the simulation results illustrate the good power and size properties for the
asymptotic inference on β0 and a′ρ0. As expected, the average length of the confidence
intervals for both β0 and a′ρ0 become shorter as the sample size increases. We find that
19Note that in Specification 1, the Baraba´si-Albert graph is generated with an Erdo¨s-Re´nyi seed graph,
where the number of nodes in the seed is set to equal the smallest integer above 5
√
n. All graphs in the
simulation study are undirected.
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TABLE 2. The Degree Characteristics of the Graphs Used in the Simulation Study
Specification 1 Specification 2
n m = 1 m = 2 m = 3 λ = 1 λ = 2 λ = 3
500 dmx 17 21 30 5 8 11
dav 1.7600 3.2980 4.8340 0.9520 1.9360 2.9600
1000 dmx 18 29 34 6 7 9
dav 1.8460 3.5240 5.2050 0.9960 1.9620 3.0020
5000 dmx 32 78 70 7 10 11
dav 1.9308 3.7884 5.6466 0.9904 2.0032 3.0228
Notes: This table gives characteristics of the payoff graphs, GP , used in the simulation study. dav and
dmx denote the average and maximum degrees of the payoff graphs.
the confidence interval for β0 exhibits empirical coverage close to the 95% nominal level,
while the confidence interval for a′ρ0 is somewhat conservative. This conservativeness is
expected, given the fact that the interval is constructed using a Bonferroni approach.
5. Empirical Application: State Presence across Municipali-
ties
5.1. Motivation and Background
State capacity (i.e., the capability of a country to provide public goods, basic services,
and the rule of law) can be limited for various reasons. (See e.g. Besley and Persson
(2009) and Gennaioli and Voth (2015)).20 A “weak state” may arise due to political cor-
ruption and clientelism, and result in spending inadequately on public goods (Acemoglu
(2005)), accommodating armed opponents of the government (Powell (2013)), and war
(McBride, Milante, and Skaperdas (2011)). Empirical evidence has shown how these
weak states can persist from precolonial times. Higher state capacities seem related to
the current level prosperity at the ethnic and national levels (Gennaioli and Rainer (2007)
and Michalopoulos and Papaioannou (2013)).
Our empirical application is based on a recent study by Acemoglu, Garc´ıa-Jimeno, and
Robinson (2015) who investigate the local choices of state capacity in Colombia, us-
ing a model of a complete information game on an exogenously formed network. In
their set-up, municipalities choose a level of spending on public goods and state pres-
ence (as measured by either the number of state employees or state agencies). There is
network externality in a municipality’s choice because municipalities that are adjacent
20See also an early work by Brett and Pinkse (2000) for an empirical study on the spatial effects on
municipal governments’ decisions on business property tax rates.
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TABLE 3. The Empirical Coverage Probability and Average Length of Confidence
Intervals for β0 at 95% Nominal Level.
Coverage Probability
Specification 1 Specification 2
β0 m = 1 m = 2 m = 3 λ = 1 λ = 2 λ = 3
−0.5 n = 500 0.9760 0.9715 0.9710 0.9740 0.9685 0.9700
n = 1000 0.9665 0.9720 0.9660 0.9785 0.9705 0.9755
n = 5000 0.9745 0.9705 0.9680 0.9715 0.9765 0.9690
−0.3 n = 500 0.9730 0.9690 0.9690 0.9740 0.9690 0.9655
n = 1000 0.9665 0.9710 0.9660 0.9750 0.9700 0.9710
n = 5000 0.9700 0.9670 0.9645 0.9710 0.9755 0.9645
0 n = 500 0.9610 0.9660 0.9715 0.9735 0.9670 0.9625
n = 1000 0.9640 0.9690 0.9690 0.9745 0.9665 0.9670
n = 5000 0.9685 0.9670 0.9655 0.9710 0.9745 0.9660
0.3 n = 500 0.9640 0.9665 0.9725 0.9780 0.9720 0.9675
n = 1000 0.9670 0.9695 0.9655 0.9770 0.9700 0.9730
n = 5000 0.9705 0.9660 0.9635 0.9725 0.9755 0.9675
0.5 n = 500 0.9725 0.9735 0.9735 0.9800 0.9715 0.9700
n = 1000 0.9690 0.9705 0.9660 0.9770 0.9770 0.9785
n = 5000 0.9720 0.9695 0.9650 0.9770 0.9755 0.9730
Average Length of CI
Specification 1 Specification 2
β0 m = 1 m = 2 m = 3 λ = 1 λ = 2 λ = 3
−0.5 n = 500 0.2735 0.3069 0.3334 0.3318 0.2933 0.2832
n = 1000 0.2264 0.2513 0.2749 0.2874 0.2489 0.2491
n = 5000 0.1771 0.1783 0.1971 0.2368 0.1917 0.1818
−0.3 n = 500 0.2541 0.2971 0.3245 0.3189 0.2818 0.2703
n = 1000 0.2132 0.2445 0.2680 0.2810 0.2398 0.2412
n = 5000 0.1710 0.1739 0.1952 0.2387 0.1901 0.1791
0 n = 500 0.2434 0.2881 0.3175 0.3043 0.2692 0.2606
n = 1000 0.2051 0.2377 0.2627 0.2730 0.2316 0.2332
n = 5000 0.1639 0.1715 0.1925 0.2373 0.1877 0.1746
0.3 n = 500 0.2481 0.2891 0.3149 0.2982 0.2652 0.2629
n = 1000 0.2114 0.2377 0.2639 0.2673 0.2260 0.2314
n = 5000 0.1657 0.1729 0.1913 0.2325 0.1884 0.1710
0.5 n = 500 0.2613 0.2974 0.3186 0.2977 0.2693 0.2691
n = 1000 0.2193 0.2429 0.2688 0.2620 0.2267 0.2350
n = 5000 0.1703 0.1770 0.1912 0.2253 0.1851 0.1687
Notes: The first half of the table reports the empirical coverage probability of the asymptotic confidence
interval for β0 and the second half reports its average length. The simulated rejection probability at the
true parameter is close to the nominal size of α = 0.05 and the average lengths decrease with n. The
simulation number is R = 2000.
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TABLE 4. The Empirical Coverage Probability and Average Length of Confidence
Intervals for a′ρ0 at 95% Nominal Level.
Coverage Probability
Specification 1 Specification 2
β0 m = 1 m = 2 m = 3 λ = 1 λ = 2 λ = 3
−0.5 n = 500 0.9945 0.9955 0.9925 0.9955 0.9950 0.9910
n = 1000 0.9925 0.9930 0.9955 0.9955 0.9970 0.9910
n = 5000 0.9850 0.9875 0.9900 0.9915 0.9925 0.9930
−0.3 n = 500 0.9935 0.9960 0.9940 0.9960 0.9950 0.9905
n = 1000 0.9905 0.9935 0.9955 0.9955 0.9960 0.9910
n = 5000 0.9795 0.9880 0.9895 0.9885 0.9940 0.9895
0 n = 500 0.9935 0.9965 0.9945 0.9955 0.9925 0.9925
n = 1000 0.9925 0.9935 0.9945 0.9960 0.9970 0.9920
n = 5000 0.9785 0.9875 0.9895 0.9840 0.9910 0.9860
0.3 n = 500 0.9950 0.9940 0.9935 0.9955 0.9915 0.9925
n = 1000 0.9940 0.9940 0.9940 0.9920 0.9965 0.9925
n = 5000 0.9790 0.9895 0.9925 0.9790 0.9860 0.9850
0.5 n = 500 0.9940 0.9925 0.9935 0.9940 0.9915 0.9920
n = 1000 0.9945 0.9940 0.9945 0.9890 0.9930 0.9930
n = 5000 0.9835 0.9900 0.9910 0.9645 0.9850 0.9860
Average Length of CI
Specification 1 Specification 2
β0 m = 1 m = 2 m = 3 λ = 1 λ = 2 λ = 3
−0.5 n = 500 1.5840 1.6752 1.7643 1.3326 1.4123 1.8075
n = 1000 1.3626 1.4522 1.4819 1.1218 1.1474 1.4152
n = 5000 0.9995 0.9979 1.0333 0.8658 0.7786 0.8503
−0.3 n = 500 1.5337 1.6361 1.7225 1.4037 1.4196 1.7567
n = 1000 1.3263 1.4140 1.4466 1.2028 1.1714 1.3966
n = 5000 0.9896 0.9749 1.0145 0.9656 0.8244 0.8650
0 n = 500 1.5068 1.6007 1.6761 1.5646 1.4632 1.6976
n = 1000 1.3060 1.3607 1.4031 1.3721 1.2259 1.3798
n = 5000 0.9840 0.9486 0.9873 1.1527 0.9154 0.8922
0.3 n = 500 1.5516 1.6019 1.6501 1.8290 1.5653 1.6869
n = 1000 1.3416 1.3257 1.3754 1.6133 1.3204 1.3959
n = 5000 1.0066 0.9412 0.9690 1.3938 1.0199 0.9213
0.5 n = 500 1.6553 1.6353 1.6567 2.1022 1.6772 1.7101
n = 1000 1.4069 1.3146 1.3731 1.8362 1.4272 1.4376
n = 5000 1.0552 0.9420 0.9542 1.5865 1.1029 0.9593
Notes: The true a′ρ0 is equal to 14. The first half of the table reports the empirical coverage probability
of the asymptotic confidence interval and the second half its average length for a′ρ0. The empirical
coverage probability of the confidence interval for a′ρ0 is generally conservative which is expected from
the use of the Bonferroni approach. Nevertheless, the length of the confidence interval is reasonably
small. The simulation number, R, is 2000.
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to each other can benefit from their neighbors’ choices of public goods provisions, such
as increased security, infrastructure and bureaucratic connections. Thus, a municipality’s
choice of state capacity can be thought of as a strategic decision on a geographic network.
It is not obvious that public good provision in one municipality leads to higher spend-
ing on public goods in neighboring municipalities. Some neighbors may free-ride and
under-invest in state presence if they anticipate others will invest highly. Rent-seeking by
municipal politicians would also limit the provision of public goods. On the other hand,
economies of scale could yield complementarities in state presence across neighboring
municipalities.
In our study, we extend the model in Acemoglu, Garc´ıa-Jimeno, and Robinson (2015)
to an incomplete information game where information may be shared across munici-
palities. In particular, we do not assume that all municipalities know and observe all
characteristics and decisions of the others. It seems reasonable that the decisions made
across the country may not be observed or well known by those municipalities that are
geographically remote.
5.2. Empirical Set-up
Let yi denote the state capacity in municipality i (as measured by the (log) number
of public employees in municipality i) and GP denote the geographic network, where
an edge is defined on two municipalities that are geographically adjacent.21 We assume
that GP is exogenously formed. The degree distribution of GP is shown in Figure 3. We
study the optimal choice of yi, where yi leads to a larger prosperity pi. Prosperity in
municipality i is modeled as:
(5.1) pi =
(
βy¯i + x1,iγ + ηi + εi + ς
D
i
)
yi,
where ςDi is a district specific dummy variable, εi and ηi are our sharable and non-sharable
private information, and y¯i = 1nP (i)
∑
j∈NP (i) yj. The term x1,i represents municipality char-
acteristics. These include geographic characteristics, such as land quality, altitude, lat-
itude, rainfall; and municipal characteristics, such as distance to highways, distance to
royal roads and Colonial State Presence.22
21This corresponds to the case in of δ1 = δ2 = 0 in Acemoglu, Garc´ıa-Jimeno, and Robinson (2015).
22Note that, from our notation in Section 3, here we take x2,i = 0. This is done for a closer correspondence
to the specification in Acemoglu, Garc´ıa-Jimeno, and Robinson (2015). Finally, note that pi is only a
function of terms that are multiplied by yi. This is a simplification from their specification. We do so
because we will focus on the best response equation. The best response equation, derived from the first
order condition to this problem, would not include any term that is not a function of yi itself.
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FIGURE 3. Degree Distribution of GP
Notes: The figure presents the degree distribution of the graph GP used in the empirical specification.
The average degree is 5.48, the maximum degree is 20, and the minimum degree is 1.
The welfare of a municipality is given by
(5.2) ui(yi, y−i, T, ηi) = pi(yi, y¯i, T, ηi)− 1
2
y2i ,
where the second term refers to the cost of higher state presence, and the first term is the
prosperity pi.
We can rewrite the welfare of the municipality by substituting (5.1) into (5.2):
(5.3) ui(yi, y−i, T, ηi) =
(
βy¯i + x1,iγ + ηi + εi + ς
D
i
)
yi − 1
2
y2i ,
which is our model from Section 3. We assume that municipalities (or the mayor in
charge), wishes to maximize welfare by choosing state presence, given their beliefs about
the types of the other municipalities.
In our specification, we allow for incomplete information. This is reflected in the
terms εi, ηi, which will be present in the best response function. The municipality, when
choosing state presence yi, will be able to observe εi of its neighbors and will use its
beliefs over the types of the others to generate its best response. The best response will
follow the results from Theorem 2.1.
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5.3. Model Specification
We closely follow Table 3 in Acemoglu, Garc´ıa-Jimeno, and Robinson (2015) for the
choice of specifications and variables. First, we will consider the model with simple
types.23
Throughout the specifications, we include longitude, latitude, surface area, elevation,
annual rainfall, department fixed effects and a department capital dummy (all in X1).
We further consider the effect of variables distance to current highways, land quality and
presence of rivers in the municipality.
For the choice of instruments, we consider two separate types of instruments. The
first is the sum of neighbor values (across GP ) of the historical variables (denoted as
Ci).24 The historical variables used are Total Crown Employees (also called Colonial State
Officials), Distance to Royal Roads, Colonial State Agencies and Historical Population, as
well as Colonial State Presence Index squared and Distance to Royal Roads squared.
Using the latter two additionally sharpens inference. We also use the variable Z˜i =
nP (i)
−1∑
j∈NP (i) λijXj,1 as part of the instrumental variable, which was shown to perform
well in the Monte Carlo Simulations in Section 4. This variable captures cross sectional
dependence as a crucial source of variation for inference on the strategic interactions. We
use downweighting of our instruments as explained in a preceding section.
5.4. Results
The results across a range of specifications are presented in Table 5. In these results,
we see that the effect is statistically different than 0 and stable across specifications. It in-
dicates that there is complementarity in the provision of public goods and state presence
(β > 0).
Let us compare our results to those in Acemoglu, Garc´ıa-Jimeno, and Robinson (2015).
There, the authors report the average marginal effects over their weighted graph. The
23In the supplemental note, we consider the empirical application with first order sophisticated types
(game Γ1), as well as the model selection test between simple types and first order sophisticated types
from Section 3.4. Since the simple type model is not rejected in the data and it is more parsimonious, we
present it in the main text. The results for the first order sophisticated case are more or less similar except
that the confidence intervals of β0 are wider. At 5%, the model selection procedure did not reject either of
the sets of the moment conditions from the simple type and the first order sophisticated players.
24For this, we assume the exclusion restriction in Acemoglu, Garc´ıa-Jimeno, and Robinson (2015), namely
that historical variables only affect prosperity in the same municipality. This means that although one’s
historical variables (Total Crown Employees, Distance to Royal Roads, Colonial State Agencies and Histori-
cal Population, as well as functions thereof) can affect the same municipality’s prosperity, it can only affect
those of the neighbors by impacting the choice of state capacity in the first, which then impacts the choice
of the state capacity in the neighbors.
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TABLE 5. State Presence and Networks Effects across Colombian Municipalities
Outcome: The Number of State Employees
Baseline Distance to Highway Land Quality Rivers
(1) (2) (3) (4)
β0 [0.16, 0.31] [0.15, 0.32] [0.17, 0.39] [0.09, 0.38]
dyi/d(colonial state [−0.051, 0.001] [−0.045,−0.001] [−0.043, 0.000] [−0.024, 0.003]
officials)
Average
dyi/d(colonial state [−1.138, 3.760] [−1.335, 2.742] [−0.609, 3.388] [−1.775, 1.987]
agencies)
Average
dyi/d(distance to [−0.010, 0.009] [−0.008, 0.010] [−0.007, 0.015] [−0.005, 0.012]
Royal Roads)
n 1018 1018 1003 1003
Notes: Confidence sets for β are presented in the table, obtained from inverting the test statistic T (β)
from Section 3 for First Order Sophisticated types, with confidence level of 95%. The critical values
in the first row come from the asymptotic statistic. Downweighting is used. The average marginal
effects for historical variables upon state capacity are also shown. The marginal effect of Colonial State
Officials is equal to its γ coefficient. The marginal effect for Distance to Royal Roads for municipality i
equals γRoyal Roads+2∗γRoyal Roads2(Royal Roads)i, where γRoyal Roads is the γ coefficient of its linear
term, and γRoyal Roads2 is the coefficient of its quadratic term, as this variable enters X1as a quadratic
form. The analogous expression holds for the variable Colonial State Agencies. We show the average
marginal effect for these two variables. We then present the confidence set for these marginal effects,
computed by the inference procedure on a′γ developed in Section 3. All specifications include controls
of latitude, longitude, surface area, elevation, rainfall, as well as Department and Department capital
dummies. Instruments are constructed from payoff neighbors’ sum of the GP neighbors values of the
historical variables Total Crown Employees, Colonial State Agencies, Colonial State Agencies squared,
population in 1843, distance to Royal Roads, distance to Royal Roads squared, together with the non-
linear function Z˜i = nP (i)−1
∑
j∈NP (i) λijXj,1. Column (2) includes distance to current highway in X1,
Column (3) expands the specification of Column (2) by also including controls for land quality (share
in each quality level). Column (4) controls for rivers in the municipality and land quality, in addition to
those controls from Column (1). One can see that the results are very stable across specifications.
(weighted) average degree is 0.0329, so our results can be compared in an approxima-
tion, by considering 0.0329 βˆ.
In general, our estimates have the same sign and significance as those of Acemoglu,
Garc´ıa-Jimeno, and Robinson (2015). Our estimates are in the range of [0.002, 0.013],
after reweighting as mentioned before, somewhat comparable to theirs of [0.016, 0.022]
(in the case of the outcome of the number of public employees, in Table 3). Hence, we
find similar qualitative effects, although a smaller magnitude. Recall that our confidence
set is built without assuming that β0 is consistently estimable.
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FIGURE 4. Average Network Externality from being a Department Capital
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Notes: The figure presents the average network externalities from being a department capital. We use
the estimated results from Column (3) in Table 5. This captures the externality for a municipality from
being a department capital, which involves higher state presence and centralization of resources. This
effect is not only the direct effect, but it also quantifies a reflection effect: neighbors of department
capitals also benefit from it. The grey shaded area represents the 95% confidence interval for β0.
In Figure 4, we show the results of our estimated network externalities for the estimates
from Table 5, for the importance of being a department capital. The average network
externality (ANE) is computed as
1
N
∑
i∈N
∑
j∈NP (i)
β0γˆdc
nP (i)(1− β0cii)(1− β0cij) ,
where γˆdc is the estimated parameter of the X1 variable department capital, and we vary
β0 within its confidence set. The parameter is defined in Section 3.1.2, and captures the
average effect of a neighbor being a department capital.
The figure shows that there is a strong and increasing network externality from being a
department capital over the range of the confidence set of β. This indicates that the effect
of being a capital has spillovers on other municipalities: since β > 0, and one expects that
department capitals have more state presence and resources, being a department capital
yields increasing returns the stronger the complementarity.
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6. Conclusion
This paper proposes a new approach of empirical modeling for interactions among
many agents when the agents observe the types of their neighbors. The main challenge
arises from the fact that the information sharing relations are typically connected among
a large number of players whereas the econometrician observes only a fraction of those
agents. Using a behavioral model of belief formation, this paper produces an explicit
form of best responses from which an asymptotic inference procedure for the payoff
parameters is developed. As we showed in our paper, this explicit form gives a reduced
form for the observed actions, and exhibits various intuitive features. For example, the
best responses show that network externality is heterogeneous across agents depending
on the relations of their payoff neighbors.
The advantage of our paper’s approach is two-fold. First, the empirical modeling ac-
cording to our approach accommodates a wide range of sampling processes. Such a
feature is crucial because the econometrician rarely has precise knowledge about the ac-
tual sampling process through which data are generated. Second, the model can be used
when only part of the players are observed from a large connected network of agents.
This can be quite useful as the econometrician typically does not observe the entire set of
agents who interact with each other.
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SUPPLEMENTAL NOTE TO “ESTIMATING LOCAL INTERACTIONS AMONG
MANY AGENTS WHO OBSERVE THEIR NEIGHBORS”
Nathan Canen, Jacob Schwartz, and Kyungchul Song
Vancouver School of Economics, University of British Columbia
This supplemental note provide further details on Canen, Schwartz, and Song (2018).
This note consists of nine appendices. In Appendix A, we formally present a model of
information sharing over time among many agents where the econometrician is inter-
ested in the estimation of local interactions in a particular decision problem. We explain
how this extended model maps to the static model of the main paper. In Appendix B,
we provide details on the construction of the asymptotic convariance matrix. Appendix
C gives the mathematical proofs of Theorems 2.1 - 3.1. Appendix D develops asymptotic
theory for inference from a model which assumes that all the agents are of the first-order
sophisticated type. Appendix E presents the Monte Carlo simulation results from the in-
ference based on the game with the first-order sophisticated players. Appendix F provides
details on the model selection procedure in Section 3.4. Appendix G presents a proposal
on testing for information sharing on unobservables. Appendix H gives the proofs of
the results on the convergence of behavioral strategies to the equilibrium strategies. Ap-
pendix I gives the results from the empirical application using the game with first-order
sophisticated agents.
Appendix A. Information Sharing Among Many Agents Over
Time
Information sharing among people takes place over time, and the econometrician usu-
ally observes part of these people as a snapshot in the process. The process involves
information sharing, network formation and decision making. Agents can form a net-
work and share information for various purposes. There is no reason to believe that each
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agent’s particular decision problem which is of interest to the econometrician is the sin-
gle ultimate concern of the agents when they form a network at an earlier time.25 In this
section, we provide an extended model of information sharing which fits the main set-up
of the paper. The main idea is that people receive signals, form networks, and share
information with their neighbors repeatedly. Then there is a decision making stage. The
network formation (of either a payoff graph or an information graph) can be made, if
not exclusively, in anticipation of the decision making later. However, as we will explain
later in detail, our model assumes that when the agents form an information and a payoff
graph, they do not observe other agents’ payoff relevant signals that are not observed by
the econometrician. This is the precise sense in which the information and the payoff
graph are exogenously formed.
Let us present a formal model of information sharing over time. Let N be the set of a
finite yet large number of players who share their type information over time recursively,
where at each stage, players go through three steps sequentially: information graph
formation, type realization and information sharing. Then at the final stage, players
make a decision, maximizing their expected utilities.
At Stage 0, each agent i ∈ N is endowed with signal Ci,0. The signals can be corre-
lated across agents in an arbitrary way. Then information sharing among agents happens
recursively over time as follows starting from Stage s = 1.
Stage s-1: (INFORMATION GRAPH FORMATION) Each player i ∈ N receives signal Ci,s−1.
Using these signals, the players in N form an information sharing network GI,s−1 =
(N,EI,s−1) among themselves, where GI,s−1 = (N,EI,s−1) is a directed graph on N .26
(TYPE REALIZATION) Each player i ∈ N is given his type vector (T ′i,s−1, ηi,s−1)′, where
ηi,s−1 is a private type which player i keeps to himself and Ti,s−1 a sharable type which is
potentially observed by other agents.
(INFORMATION SHARING) Each player i observes the sharable type Tj,s−1 of each player
j in his neighborhood in the information sharing network.
Stage s: (INFORMATION GRAPH FORMATION) Each player i ∈ N receives signal Ci,s
which contains part of Ci,s−1 and part of the information about GI,s−1 and Tj,s−1 with
j ∈ NI,s−1(i). Using these signals, the players in N form an information sharing network
25For example, it is highly implausible to assume that friendship formation among the students is done for
the sole purpose of achieving maximal performance in a math exam observed by the econometrician.
26The formation of an information sharing network is tantamount to each agent making a (unilateral)
binary decision to share his type information with others. Details of this decision making process are not of
focus in the empirical model and hence are not elaborated further. What suffices for us is that the strategy
of each agent is measurable with respect to the information the agent has. This latter condition is satisfied
typically when the agent chooses a pure strategy given his information.
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GI,s = (N,EI,s) among themselves, where GI,s = (N,EI,s) is a directed graph on N , and
receives signal Ci,s.
(TYPE REALIZATION) Each player i ∈ N is given his type vector (T ′i,s, ηi,s)′, where ηi,s is
a private type which player i keeps to himself and Ti,s a sharable type which is potentially
observed by other agents.
(INFORMATION SHARING) Each player i observes the sharable type Tj,s of each player j
in his neighborhood in the information sharing network GI,s.
The information sharing activities proceed up to Stage S − 1. Then each agent faces a
decision making problem.
Decision Stage: (PAYOFF GRAPH FORMATION) Each player i ∈ N receives signal Ci,S
which contains part of Ci,S−1 and part of information about GI,S−1 and Tj,S−1 with j ∈
NI,S−1(i). Using these signals, the players in N form a payoff graph GP = (N,EP ) among
themselves, where GI,S = (N,EI,S) is a directed graph on N , and receives signal Ci,S.
(TYPE REALIZATION) Each player i ∈ N is given his type vector (T ′i,S, ηi,S)′, where ηi,S is
a private type which player i keeps to himself and Ti,S a sharable type which is potentially
observed by other agents.
(INFORMATION SHARING) Each player i observes the sharable type Tj,S of each player j
in his neighborhood in the information sharing network GI,S.
(DECISION) Each player i makes a decision which maximizes his expected utility given
his beliefs about other agents’ strategies using the information accumulated so far.
Now let us consider how this model of information sharing over time maps to our
static local interactions model in our main paper. Our local interactions model captures
the state where each player in N faces the Decision Stage as follows. The information
graph GI corresponds to GI,S and the payoff graph GP as described in Decision Stage
above. The type vector Ti and ηi for each player i ∈ N correspond to Ti,S and ηi,S as
above. The signal Ci for each agent i is defined to be
Ci =
S∨
s=1
Ci,s.
Therefore, each agent i’s signal Ci contains the information that has been accumulated so
far. This information contains past information sharing experiences that have happened
over time.
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Observe that here we deliberately separate the information sharing stage and the deci-
sion stage. This is because people typically share information without necessarily antici-
pating the particular decision problem that the econometrician happens to later investi-
gate.
Appendix B. Estimation of the Asymptotic Covariance Matrix
B.1. Games with Simple Type Players
We now explain our proposal to estimate the asymptotic covariance matrix, given in
equation (3.12) for the model with agents of simple type.
We first explain our proposal to estimate Λ consistently for the case of β0 6= 0. Then,
we later show how the estimator works even for the case of β0 = 0. We first write
vi = Ri(ε) + ηi,(B.1)
where
Ri(ε) = λiiεi +
β0λii
nP (i)
∑
j∈NP (i)
λijεj.
Define for i, j ∈ N ,
eij = E [Ri(ε)Rj(ε)|F ] /σ2ε ,
where σ2ε denotes the variance of εi. It is not hard to see that for all i ∈ N ,
eii = λ
2
ii +
β20λ
2
ii
n2P (i)
∑
j∈NP (i)
λ2ij,
and for i 6= j such that NP (i) ∩NP (j) 6= ∅, eij = β0qε,ij, where
qε,ij =
λjiλiiλjj1{i ∈ NP (j)}
nP (j)
+
λijλiiλjj1{j ∈ NP (i)}
nP (i)
+
β0λiiλjj
nP (i)nP (j)
∑
k∈NP (i)∩NP (j)
λikλjk.
Thus, we write
1
n∗
∑
i∈N∗
E[v2i |F ] = aεσ2ε + σ2η, and(B.2)
1
n∗
∑
i∈N∗
∑
j∈NP (i)∩N∗
E[vivj|F ] = β0bεσ2ε ,
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where σ2η denotes the variance of ηi,
aε =
1
n∗
∑
i∈N∗
eii, and bε =
1
n∗
∑
i∈N∗
∑
j∈NP (i)∩N∗
qε,ij.
(Note that since not all agents in NP (i) are in N∗ for all i ∈ N∗, the set NP (i) ∩N∗ does
not necessarily coincide with NP (i).) When β0 6= 0, the solution takes the following form:
σ2ε =
1
n∗β0bε
∑
i∈N∗
∑
j∈NP (i)∩N∗
E[vivj|F ] and(B.3)
σ2η =
1
n∗
∑
i∈N∗
E[v2i |F ]−
aε
n∗β0bε
∑
i∈N∗
∑
j∈NP (i)∩N∗
E[vivj|F ].
In other words, when β0 6= 0, i.e., when there is strategic interaction among the players,
we can “identify” σ2ε and σ
2
η by using the variances and covariances of residuals vi’s. The
intuition is as follows. Since the source of cross-sectional dependence of vi’s is due to
the presence of εi’s, we can identify first σ2ε using covariance between vi and vj for linked
pairs i, j, and then identify σ2η by subtracting from the variance of vi the contribution
from εi.
In order to obtain a consistent estimator of Λ which does not require that β0 6= 0, we
derive its alternative expression. Let us first write
Λ = Λ1 + Λ2,(B.4)
where
Λ1 =
1
n∗
∑
i∈N∗
E[v2i |F ]ϕ˜iϕ˜′i, and
Λ2 =
1
n∗
∑
i∈N∗
∑
j∈N∗−i
E[vivj|F ]ϕ˜iϕ˜′j,
where N∗−i = N
∗\{i}. Using (B.1) and (B.3), we can rewrite
Λ2 =
1
n∗
∑
i∈N∗
∑
j∈N∗−i:NP (i)∩NP (j)6=∅
eijσ
2
ε ϕ˜iϕ˜
′
j
=
β0
n∗
∑
i∈N∗
∑
j∈N∗−i:NP (i)∩NP (j)6=∅
qε,ijσ
2
ε ϕ˜iϕ˜
′
j
=
sε
n∗
∑
i∈N∗
∑
j∈N∗−i:NP (i)∩NP (j)6=∅
qε,ijϕ˜iϕ˜
′
j,
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where
sε =
∑
i∈N∗
∑
j∈NP (i)∩N∗
E[vivj|F ]∑
i∈N∗
∑
j∈NP (i)∩N∗
qε,ij
.
Now, it is clear that with this expression for Λ2, the definition of Λ is well defined
regardless of whether β0 = 0 or β0 6= 0. We can then find the estimator of Λ, Λˆ, by using
the empirical analogues to the above, as shown in the main text.
B.2. Games with First Order Sophisticated Players
We first construct a consistent estimator ΛˆFS of Λˆ. Define for i, j ∈ N ,
eFSij = E[R
FS
i (ε)R
FS
j (ε)|F ]/σ2ε .
In fact, it turns out that
eFSii =
(
1 + β20 λ˜ii
)2
+
β20
nP (i)2
∑
j∈NP (i)
λ2jj(B.5)
+
2β30
nP (i)
∑
j∈NP (i)
λjjλ˜ij +
∑
j∈NP,2(i)
β40 λ˜
2
ij,(B.6)
and for i 6= j, eFSij = β0qFSε,ij, where
qFSε,ij =
(1 + β20 λ˜ii)λii
nP (j)
1{i ∈ NP (j)}+ β0
(
1 + β20 λ˜ii
)
λ˜ji1{i ∈ NP,2(j)}(B.7)
+
λjj(1 + β
2
0 λ˜jj)
nP (i)
1{j ∈ NP (i)}+ β0
nP (j)nP (i)
∑
k∈NP (i)∩NP (j)
λ2kk
+
β20
nP (i)
∑
k∈NP (i)∩NP,2(j)
λkkλ˜jk + β0
(
1 + β20 λ˜jj
)
λ˜ij1{j ∈ NP,2(i)}
+
β20
nP (j)
∑
k∈NP,2(i)∩NP (j)
λ˜ikλkk + β
3
0
∑
k∈NP,2(i)∩NP,2(j)
λ˜ikλ˜jk,
where the last term is zero if NP,2(i) ∩ NP,2(j) is empty. Similarly, sums over empty sets
in any of the terms above are zero. Let us now write
ΛFS = ΛFS1 + Λ
FS
2 ,
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where
ΛFS1 =
1
n∗
∑
i∈N∗
E[(vFSi )
2|F ]ϕ˜iϕ˜′i, and
ΛFS2 =
1
n∗
∑
i∈N∗
∑
j∈N∗−i
E[vFSi v
FS
j |F ]ϕ˜iϕ˜′j.
To motivate estimation of ΛFS2 , we rewrite
ΛFS2 =
1
n∗
∑
i∈N∗
∑
j∈N∗−i
(eFSij )σ
2
ε ϕ˜iϕ˜
′
j =
β0
n∗
∑
i∈N∗
∑
j∈N∗−i
qFSε,ijσ
2
ε ϕ˜iϕ˜
′
j.(B.8)
Let us find an expression for σ2ε . Note that
1
n∗
∑
i∈N∗
∑
j∈NP (i)∩N∗
E[vFSi v
FS
j |F ] = β0bFSε σ2ε ,
where
bFSε =
1
n∗
∑
i∈N∗
∑
j∈NP (i)∩N∗
qFSε,ij.
Hence if we let
sFSε =
∑
i∈N∗
∑
j∈NP (i)∩N∗
E[vFSi v
FS
j |F ]∑
i∈N∗
∑
j∈NP (i)∩N∗
qFSε,ij
,
we have
σ2εβ0 = s
FS
ε .
Plugging this in the last term in (B.8), we obtain that
ΛFS2 =
sFSε
n∗
∑
i∈N∗
∑
j∈N∗−i
qFSε,ijϕ˜iϕ˜
′
j.
Our estimator then uses the empirical analogues to find Λˆ. We now present a consistent
estimator ΛˆFS:
ΛˆFS = ΛˆFS1 + Λˆ
FS
2 ,
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where
ΛˆFS1 =
1
n∗
∑
i∈N∗
(v˜FSi )
2ϕ˜iϕ˜
′
i, and
ΛˆFS2 =
sˆFSε
n∗
∑
i∈N∗
∑
j∈N∗−i:NP,2(i)∩NP,2(j)6=∅
qFSε,ijϕ˜iϕ˜
′
j,
and
sˆFSε =
∑
i∈N∗
∑
j∈NP (i)∩N∗
v˜FSi v˜
FS
j∑
i∈N∗
∑
j∈NP (i)∩N∗
qFSε,ij
,
with qFSε,ij as defined in (B.7). For this, we construct v˜
FS
i as we constructed v˜i using Z
FS in
place of Z.
Appendix C. Proofs of Theorems 2.1 - 3.1
In this section we provide the proofs of Theorems 2.1 - 3.1. Throughout the proofs,
we use the notation C1 and C2 to represent a constant which does not depend on n or
n∗. Without loss of generality, we also assume that N∗ is F -measurable. This loses no
generality because due to Condition A of the sampling process in the paper, the same
proof goes through if we redefine F to be the σ-field generated by both F and N∗.
Theorem C.1 below encompasses Theorem 2.1 as a special case.
Theorem C.1. Suppose that Assumptions 2.1 - 2.2 hold except that Condition (BP-a’) is
replaced by Condition (BP-a): wikk = φikwii, for some positive nubmer φik > 0, and for each
i ∈ N and k 6= i, E[ηk|Ii,0] = 0. Then each player i’s best response sBRi from game Γ0 takes
the following form:
sBRi (Ii,0) = λii
γ′0Xi,1 + εi + β0nP (i) ∑
j∈NP (i)
φijλij(γ
′
0Xj,1 + εj)

+
1
nP (i)
∑
j∈NP (i)
λijδ
′
0Xj,2 + ηi,
where λij ≡ 1/(1− β0cij).
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Proof of Theorem C.1: From the optimization of agent i who believes that the other
agents play linear strategies in (2.4), we have
sBRi (Ii,0) = X ′i,1γ0 +X ′i,2δ0 + β0
 1
nP (i)
∑
k∈NP (i)
∑
j∈NP (k)
wi′kjTj
+ εi + ηi.(C.1)
Reorganizing the terms, and noting that GP is undirected, we have
sBRi (Ii,0) =
γ0 + β0
nP (i)
∑
k∈NP (i)
wiki,1
′Xi,1 +
1 + β0
nP (i)
∑
k∈NP (i)
wiki,ε
 εi + An +Bn,
where
An =
β0
nP (i)
∑
k∈NP (i)
wi′ki,2Xi,2, and
Bn = β0
∑
j∈NI(i)
1
nP (i)
∑
k∈NP (i)
(wi′kj,1Xj,1 + w
i
kj,εεj)1{j ∈ NP (k)}
+β0
∑
j∈NP (i)
1
nP (i)
∑
k∈NP (i)
wi′kj,2Xj,21{j ∈ NP (k)}
+
1
nP (i)
∑
k∈NP (i)
δ′0Xk,2.
By setting the coefficients of Xj,1, εj and Xj,2 to be wij,1, w
i
j,ε and w
i
j,2, we obtain that
wii,1 = γ0 + β0Miwii,1,(C.2)
wii,ε = 1 + β0Miwii,ε,
wii,2 = β0Miwii,2,
and for all j ∈ NI(i),
wij,1 = β0Miwij,1,(C.3)
wij,ε = β0Miwij,ε, and
wij,2 =
{
δ0/nP (i) + β0Miwij,2, if j ∈ NP (i),
β0Miwij,2, if j ∈ NI(i)\NP (i),
where, with wij = (w
i
kj)k∈N ,
Miwij =
1
nP (i)
∑
k∈NP (i)
wikj1{j ∈ NP (k)}.
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Now, we apply the behavioral assumptions to this operator to obtain the following:
Miwii =
1
nP (i)
∑
k∈NP (i)
1
n¯P (k)
wii = ciiwii.
By plugging this into (C.2), we have
wii,1 = γ0 + β0wii,1cii,(C.4)
wii,ε = 1 + β0wii,εcii,
and
wii,2 = wii,2 · β0
nP (i)
∑
k∈NP (i)
1{i ∈ NP (k)}
n¯P (k)
= β0wii,2cii.
The last equation gives wii,2 = 0, because |β0cii| < 1, and the first two equations give
wii,1 =
γ0
1− β0cii(C.5)
and
wii,ε =
1
1− β0cii .(C.6)
Also, we turn toMiwij:
Miwij =
1
nP (i)
∑
k∈NP (i)
wikj1{j ∈ NP (k)}+
wijj1{j ∈ NP (i)}
nP (i)
(C.7)
=
1
nP (i)
∑
k∈NP (i)
wij1{j ∈ NP (k) ∩NP (i)}
+
1
nP (i)
∑
k∈NP (i)
κijwij1{j ∈ NP (k) \NP (i)}+
wijj1{j ∈ NP (i)}
nP (i)
,
where the last term corresponds to the case j = k ∈ NP (i). Define
c˜ij =
1
nP (i)
∑
k∈NP (i)
1{j ∈ NP (k) ∩NP (i)}+ κij
nP (i)
∑
k∈NP (i)
1{j ∈ NP (k) \NP (i)}.
Using wijj = φijwii, we rewrite
Miwij,1 = c˜ijwij,1 +
wii,1φij1{j ∈ NP (i)}
nP (i)
= c˜ijwij,1 +
γ0
1− β0cii
1
nP (i)
φij1{j ∈ NP (i)}
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and
Miwij,ε = c˜ijwij,ε +
wii,εφij1{j ∈ NP (i)}
nP (i)
= c˜ijwij,ε +
1
1− β0cii
1
nP (i)
φij1{j ∈ NP (i)}.
We plug this into (C.3) to obtain
wij,1 =
β0γ0φij1{j ∈ NP (i)}
nP (i)(1− β0c˜ij)(1− β0cii) ,
and
wij,ε =
β0φij1{j ∈ NP (i)}
nP (i)(1− β0c˜ij)(1− β0cii) .
Finally, let us consider wij,2. Note that from (C.7),
Miwij,2 = c˜ijwij,2,
because wii,2 = 0. By plugging this into (C.3), we obtain that
wij,2 =
{
δ0/nP (i) + β0c˜ijwij,2, if j ∈ NP (i),
β0c˜ijwij,2, if j ∈ NI(i)\NP (i),
=
{
δ0/nP (i) + β0c˜ijwij,2, if j ∈ NP (i),
0, if j ∈ NI(i)\NP (i),
where the last zero follows from the equality wij,2 = β0c˜ijwij,2 with |β0c˜ij| < 1. Therefore,
we have
wij,2 =
δ01{j ∈ NP (i)}
nP (i)(1− β0c˜ij) .
The weights wij found are such that wij = 0 for all j /∈ NP (i). Thus relevant j’s that
appear in the best responses are only those j’s such that j ∈ NP (i), and in this case,
c˜ij = cij. 
Theorem C.2. Suppose that Assumptions 2.1 - 2.2 hold except that Condition (BP-a) is
replaced by Condition (BP-a): wikk = φkiwii, for some positive number φik > 0, and for each
i ∈ N and k 6= i, E[ηk|Ii] = 0. Then each player i’s best response sBR.FSi from game Γ1 takes
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the following form:
sBR.FSi (Ii1) = γ0Xi,1 + εi +
β0
nP (i)
∑
j∈NP (i)
λjj(γ
′
0Xj,1 + εj) + β
2
0
∑
j∈NP,2(i)
λ˜∗ij(γ
′
0Xj,1 + εj)
+ δ0X i,2 + δ
′
0β0
∑
j∈NP,2(i)
λ¯ijXj,2 + ηi,
where,
λ¯ij =
1
nP (i)
∑
k∈NP (i)
λkj1{j ∈ NP (k)}
nP (k)
, and
λ˜∗ij =
1
nP (i)
∑
k∈NP (i)
φkjλkj1{j ∈ NP (k)}
nP (k)(1− β0ckk) .
Proof of Theorem C.2: Suppose each agent is first-order sophisticated (FS) type; i.e.,
each i ∈ N believes that each k 6= i is simple type and chooses strategies according to:
sik =
∑
j∈NP (k)
T ′jw
i
kj + ηk.
The best responses of FS types are linear because the utility is quadratic in the player’s
own actions, and they believe simple types play according to linear strategies, with i’s
best response taking the form
sBR.FSi (Ii,1) =X ′i,1γ0 +X ′i,2δ0 + β0
 1
nP (i)
∑
k∈NP (i)
sik
+ ηi + εi.
Since an agent i with FS-type believes that all other agents are of simple type, we have
that wikj equal the weights given by player k to player j according to the best response
strategies in Theorem 2.1. Using λij = 1/(1 − β0cij), together with the Theorem 2.1
weights, in equations (C.2) - (C.3), we obtain the FS weights as follows:
wii,1 = γ0 +
β0
nP (i)
∑
k∈NP (i)
β0γ0φkiλki1{i ∈ NP (k)}
nP (k)(1− β0ckk) ,
wii,ε = 1 +
β0
nP (i)
∑
k∈NP (i)
β0φkiλki1{i ∈ NP (k)}
nP (k)(1− β0ckk) ,
wii,2 =
β0
nP (i)
∑
k∈NP (i)
δ0λki1{i ∈ NP (k)}
nP (k)
,
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and for each j ∈ NP,2(i),
wij,1 =
β0
nP (i)
∑
k∈NP (i)
wikj,11{j ∈ NP (k)}
=
β0
nP (i)
 ∑
k∈NP (i)
wikj,11{j ∈ NP (k)}+ wijj,11{j = k}

=
β0
nP (i)
∑
k∈NP (i)
β0γ0φkjλkj1{j ∈ NP (k)}
nP (k)(1− β0ckk) +
β0γ01{j ∈ NP (i)}
nP (i)(1− β0cjj) .
Analogously,
wij,ε =
β01{j ∈ NP (i)}
nP (i)(1− β0cjj) +
β0
nP (i)
∑
k∈NP (i)
β0φkjλkj1{j ∈ NP (k)}
nP (k)(1− β0ckk) ,
and as for wij,2, if j ∈ NP (i),
wij,2 = δ0/nP (i) +
β0
nP (i)
∑
k∈NP (i)
δ0λkj1{j ∈ NP (k)}
nP (k)
,
and if j ∈ NP,2(i)\NP (i),
wij,2 =
β0
nP (i)
∑
k∈NP (i)
δ0λkj1{j ∈ NP (k)}
nP (k)
.
Next, using the definitions of λ¯ij and λ˜∗ij in the theorem, we write
wii,1 = γ0 + β
2
0γ0λ˜
∗
ii,
wii,ε = 1 + β
2
0 λ˜
∗
ii,
and wii,2 = β0δ0λ¯ii. Lastly, for each j ∈ NP,2(i), we have
wij,1 =
β0γ0λjj1{j ∈ NP (i)}
nP (i)
+ β20γ0λ˜
∗
ij,
wij,ε =
β0λjj1{j ∈ NP (i)}
nP (i)
+ β20 λ˜
∗
ij,
and
wij,2 =
β0δ0λ¯ij, j ∈ NP,2(i)\NP (i)δ0/nP (i) + β0δ0λ¯ij, j ∈ NP (i).
Substituting these weights back into the best response function for FS types, we obtain
the desired result. 
We introduce auxiliary lemmas which are used for proving Theorem 3.1.
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Lemma C.1. For any array of numbers {aij}i,j∈N and a sequence {bi}i∈N of numbers, we
have for any subsets A,B ⊂ N and for any undirected graph G = (N,E),
∑
i∈B
∑
j∈N(i)∩A
aijbj =
∑
i∈A
 ∑
j∈N(i)∩B
aji
 bi,
where N(i) = {i ∈ N : ij ∈ E}.
Proof: Since the graph G is undirected, i.e, 1{j ∈ N(i)} = 1{i ∈ N(j)}, we write the
left hand side sum as∑
i∈B
∑
j∈A
1{j ∈ N(i)}aijbj =
∑
j∈A
∑
i∈B
1{i ∈ N(j)}aijbj.
Interchanging the index notation i and j gives the desired result. 
Lemma C.2. Suppose that the conditions of Theorem 3.1 hold. Then,
Λ−1/2
1√
n∗
∑
i∈N∗
ϕ˜ivi →d N(0, IM).
Proof: Choose any vector b ∈ RM such that ||b|| = 1 and let ϕ˜i,b = b′ϕ˜i. Define
ai = λiiϕ˜i,b1{i ∈ N∗}+ β0
∑
j∈NP (i)∩N∗
ϕ˜j,bλjiλjj
nP (j)
.
Using Lemma C.1, we can write
1√
n∗
∑
i∈N∗
ϕ˜i,bvi =
∑
i∈N◦
ξi,(C.8)
where we recall N◦ =
⋃
i∈N∗ NP (i), and
ξi = (aiεi + ϕ˜i,bηi1{i ∈ N∗})/
√
n∗.
By the Berry-Esseen Lemma for independent random variables (see, e.g., Shorack (2000),
p.259),
sup
t∈R
∣∣∣P {∑
i∈N◦
ξi
σξ,i
≤ t|F
}
− Φ(t)
∣∣∣ ≤ 9E
[∑
i∈N◦
|ξi|3|F
]
(∑
i∈N◦
σ2ξ,i
)3/2 ,(C.9)
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where σ2ξ,i = V ar(ξi|F). It suffices to show that the last bound vanishes in probability as
n∗ →∞. First, observe that∑
i∈N◦
σ2ξ,i =
1
n∗
∑
i∈N◦
(a2iσ
2
ε + ϕ˜
2
i,bσ
2
η1{i ∈ N∗}) ≥
σ2η
n∗
∑
i∈N∗
ϕ˜2i,b = σ
2
η > 0,
because 1
n∗
∑
i∈N∗ ϕ˜
2
i,b = 1. Observe that
E
[∑
i∈N◦
|ξi|3|F
]
≤ 4 maxi∈N E[|εi|
3|F ]
(n∗)3/2
∑
i∈N◦
|ϕ˜i,b|3|ai|3(C.10)
+
4 maxi∈N E[|ηi|3|F ]
(n∗)3/2
∑
i∈N◦
|ϕ˜i,b|3
≤ C1 maxi∈N E[|εi|
3|F ]
(n∗)3/2
∑
i∈N◦
|ai|3 + C1n
◦maxi∈N E[|ηi|3|F ]
(n∗)3/2
,
for some constant C1 > 0, by Assumption 3.3. Now, using the fact that for i, j ∈ N◦ such
that for i 6= j, 0 < λij ≤ C/(1 − β0) (which is due to 0 ≤ cij ≤ 1 for all i, j ∈ N and
β0 ∈ (−1, 1)), and for i = j, 0 < λii ≤ 1/(1− β0), and that
|ϕ˜i,b| ≤ C,
for some constant C > 0, we bound the leading term as (for some constants C2, C3 > 0)
C2
n∗
∑
i∈N◦
|ai|3 ≤ C
(1− β0)3
1
n∗
∑
i∈N◦
ϕ˜i,b1{i ∈ N∗}+ β0 ∑
j∈NP (i)∩N∗
ϕ˜j,bλjiλjj
nP (j)
3
≤ C3
(1− β0)3 +
C3
(1− β0)6R
3
n,
where
Rn =
1
n∗
∑
i∈N◦
∑
j∈NP (i)∩N∗
1
nP (j)
.
Using Lemma C.1, we rewrite
Rn =
1
n∗
∑
i∈N∗
1
nP (i)
∑
j∈NP (i)
1 = 1,
for some constant C > 0. Hence we find that for some constant C1 > 0,
1
n∗
∑
i∈N◦
|ai|3 ≤ C1
(1− β0)6 .
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Therefore, for some constant C2 > 0,
E
[∑
i∈N◦
|ξi|3|F
]
≤ C2√
n∗(1− β0)6
max
i∈N∗
E[|εi|3|F ] + C2n
◦
(n∗)3/2
max
i∈N∗
E[|ηi|3|F ].
Thus we conclude that the bound in (C.9) is OP ((n∗)−1/2 + n◦(n∗)−3/2), where n◦ = |N◦|.
However, for some constant C > 0,
n◦ ≤
∑
i∈N∗
|NP (i)| ≤ Cn∗,
by Assumption 3.4. Hence we obtain the desired result.
Lemma C.3. Suppose that the conditions of Theorem 3.1 hold. Then for some constant
C1 > 0,
E
[||Sϕ˜v||2|F] = O((n∗)−1), and E [||SZ∗v||2|F] = O((n∗)−1),
where Z∗i =
∑
j∈NP (i)∩N∗ Zj, Sϕ˜v =
1
n∗
∑
i∈N∗ ϕ˜ivi, and SZ∗v =
1
n∗
∑
i∈N∗ Z
∗
i vi.
Proof: Note that
E
[||Sϕ˜v||2|F] ≤ σ2ε
(n∗)2
∑
i∈N∗
∑
j∈N∗−i:NP (i)∩NP (j)6=∅
|eij|||ϕ˜i||||ϕ˜j||+ 1
(n∗)2
∑
i∈N∗
(|eii|σ2ε + σ2η)||ϕ˜i||2.
However, since ||ϕ˜i|| ≤ C by Assumption 3.3, the leading term on the right hand side is
bounded by for some constants C1, C2 > 0,
C1σ
2
εβ0
(n∗)2(1− β0)4
∑
i∈N∗
∑
j∈N∗−i:NP (i)∩NP (j)6=∅
|NP (i) ∩NP (j)|
nP (i)nP (j)
+
C1σ
2
ε
n∗(1− β0)3 ≤
C2
n∗
,
and the second term by Cσ2η/n
∗ for some constant C > 0. Hence the first bound follows.
Let us turn to the second bound. Observe that by Assumption 3.3, we have some C > 0
such that for all i ∈ N∗, ||Z∗i || ≤ C. Following the same proof as before, we find that
E [||SZ∗v||2|F ] is bounded by
C1σ
2
εβ0
(n∗)2(1− β0)4
∑
i∈N∗
∑
j∈N∗−i:NP (i)∩NP (j)6=∅
|NP (i) ∩NP (j)||NP (i) ∩N∗||NP (j) ∩N∗|
nP (i)nP (j)
+
C1σ
2
ε
n∗(1− β0)3 .
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The leading term is bounded by (for some constants C1, C2, C3)
C1σ
2
εβ0
(n∗)2(1− β0)4
∑
i∈N∗
∑
j∈N∗−i:NP (i)∩NP (j)6=∅
|NP (i) ∩NP (j)|
≤ C2σ
2
εβ0
(n∗)2(1− β0)4
∑
i∈N∗
|NP (i) ∩N∗| ≤ C3σ
2
εβ0
n∗(1− β0)4 .
Thus we obtain the desired result. 
Lemma C.4. Suppose that the conditions of Theorem 3.1 hold. Then the following holds.
(i) 1
n∗
∑
i∈N∗(v˜
2
i − v2i )ϕ˜iϕ˜′i = OP (1/
√
n∗).
(ii) 1
n∗
∑
i∈N∗
∑
j∈NP (i)∩N∗(v˜iv˜j − vivj)ϕ˜iϕ˜′j = OP (1/n∗).
(iii) 1
n∗
∑
i∈N∗(v
2
i − E[v2i |F ])ϕ˜iϕ˜′i = OP (1/
√
n∗).
(iv) 1
n∗
∑
i∈N∗
∑
j∈NP (i)∩N∗(vivj − E[vivj|F ])ϕ˜iϕ˜′j = OP (1/
√
n∗).
Proof: (i) First, write v˜ − v = −Z(ρ˜− ρ0), where ρ˜− ρ0 =
[
SZϕ˜S
′
Zϕ˜
]−1
SZϕ˜Sϕ˜v. Hence∥∥∥∥∥ 1n∗ ∑
i∈N∗
(v˜i − vi)2ϕ˜iϕ˜′i
∥∥∥∥∥ ≤ C1n∗ ∑
i∈N∗
(v˜i − vi)2,
for some constant C1 > 0. As for the last term, note that
1
n∗
∑
i∈N∗
E
[
(v˜i − vi)2|F
]
(C.11)
=
1
n∗
tr
(
S ′Zϕ˜
[
SZϕ˜S
′
Zϕ˜
]−1
SZZ
[
SZϕ˜S
′
Zϕ˜
]−1
SZϕ˜Λ
)
= OP
(
1
n∗
)
,
by definition of Λ and by Lemma C.3. However, we need to deal with∣∣∣ 1
n∗
∑
i∈N∗
(v˜2i − v2i )
∣∣∣ ≤√ 1
n∗
∑
i∈N∗
(v˜i − vi)2
√
1
n∗
∑
i∈N∗
(v˜i + vi)2.(C.12)
Note that
1
n∗
∑
i∈N∗
(v˜i + vi)
2 ≤ 2
n∗
∑
i∈N∗
(v˜i − vi)2 + 8
n∗
∑
i∈N∗
v2i
= OP
(
1
n∗
)
+
8
n∗
∑
i∈N∗
v2i ,
by (C.11). As for the last term,
1
n∗
∑
i∈N∗
E[v2i |F ] ≤
2
n∗
∑
i∈N∗
E[R2i (ε)|F ] +
2
n∗
∑
i∈N∗
E[η2i |F ].
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The last term is bounded by 2σ2η, and the first term on the right hand side is bounded by
2σ2ε
(1− β0)2 +
2
n∗
∑
i∈N∗
E
 β0
nP (i)
∑
j∈NP (i)
λijλiiεj
2 |F
 ≤ C.
Combining this with (C.11) and (C.12), we obtain the desired result.
(ii) Let us first write
1
n∗
∑
i∈N∗
∑
j∈NP (i)∩N∗
(v˜iv˜j − vivj)
=
1
n∗
∑
i∈N∗
∑
j∈NP (i)∩N∗
(v˜i − vi)(v˜j − vj)
+
1
n∗
∑
i∈N∗
∑
j∈NP (i)∩N∗
(v˜i − vi)vj
+
1
n∗
∑
i∈N∗
∑
j∈NP (i)∩N∗
vi(v˜j − vj) = An,1 + An,2 + An,3, say.
As for the leading term, by Cauchy-Schwarz inequality,
|An,1| =
√
1
n∗
∑
i∈N∗
(v˜i − vi)2
√√√√√ 1
n∗
∑
i∈N∗
 ∑
j∈NP (i)∩N∗
(v˜j − vj)
2.
Note that
1
n∗
∑
i∈N∗
E
 ∑
j∈NP (i)∩N∗
(v˜j − vj)
2 |F

≤ 1
n∗
∑
i∈N∗
|NP (i) ∩N∗|
∑
j∈NP (i)∩N∗
E
[
(v˜j − vj)2 |F
]
=
1
n∗
∑
i∈N∗
 ∑
j∈NP (i)∩N∗
|NP (j) ∩N∗|
E [(v˜i − vi)2 |F] ,
where the inequality above uses Jensen’s inequality and the equality above uses Lemma
C.1. Hence the last term is bounded by
maxi∈N∗ |NP (i) ∩N∗|2
n∗
∑
i∈N∗
E
[
(v˜i − vi)2 |F
] ≤ OP ( 1
n∗
)
.
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by (C.11). Thus we conclude that
|An,1| = OP
(
1
n∗
)
.
Now, let us turn to An,2. Observe that
An,2 = − 1
n∗
∑
i∈N∗
Z ′i
∑
j∈NP (i)∩N∗
vj(ρ˜− ρ0)
= −
(
1
n∗
∑
i∈N∗
Z∗
′
i vi
)
(ρ˜− ρ0) = −SZ∗v(ρ˜− ρ0)
using Lemma C.1. From the proof of (i), we obtain that
ρ˜− ρ0 = OP
(
1√
n∗
)
.
Hence combined with Lemma C.3, we have
|An,2| = OP
(
1
n∗
)
.
Since by Lemma C.1, An,2 = An,3, the proof of (ii) is complete.
(iii) Note that
V ar
(
1
n∗
∑
i∈N∗
R2i (ε)|F
)
≤ 2
(n∗)2
∑
i∈N∗
V ar
(
λ2iiε
2
i |F
)
+
2
(n∗)2
∑
i∈N∗
V ar
 β0λii
nP (i)
∑
j∈NP (i)
λijεj
2 |F
 .
The leading term is OP ((n∗)−1). The last term is bounded by
2
(n∗)2
∑
i∈N∗
β40λ
4
ii
1
nP (i)
∑
j∈NP (i)
λ4ijE[ε
4
j |F ] = OP ((n∗)−1).
Since vi = Ri(ε) + ηi and εi’s and ηi’s are independent, we obtain the desired rate.
(iv) For simplicity of notation, define
Vij = (vivj − E[vivj|F ])ϕ˜iϕ˜′j.
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Then we write
E
 1
n∗
∑
i∈N∗
∑
j∈NP (i)∩N∗
Vij
2 |F

=
1
(n∗)2
∑
i1∈N∗
∑
j1∈NP (i)∩N∗
∑
i2∈N∗
∑
j2∈NP (i)∩N∗
E [Vi1j1Vi2j2|F ] .
The last expection is zero, whenever (i2, j2) is away from (i1, j1) by more than two edges.
Hence we can bound the last term by (using Assumption 3.4))
C1
n∗
max
i∈N
E[v2i |F ] ≤
C2
n∗
for some constants C1, C2 which do not depend on n. 
Lemma C.5. Suppose that the conditions of Theorem 3.1 hold. Then,
Λˆ− Λ = OP
(
1√
n∗
)
.
Proof: We write
Λˆ1 − Λ1 = 1
n∗
∑
i∈N∗
(v˜2i − E[v2i |F ])ϕ˜iϕ˜′i and
Λˆ2 − Λ2 = sˆε − sε
n∗
∑
i∈N∗
∑
j∈NP (i)∩N∗
qij,εϕ˜iϕ˜
′
j.
By Assumption 3.2 and Lemma C.4(ii)(iv), we have
sˆε − sε = OP (1/
√
n∗).
The desired result follows by using this and applying Lemma C.4(i)(iii) to Λˆ1 − Λ1. 
Lemma C.6. Suppose that the conditions of Theorem 3.1 hold. Then the following holds.
(i) 1
n∗
∑
i∈N∗(vˆ
2
i − v2i )ϕ˜iϕ˜′i = OP (1/
√
n∗).
(ii) 1
n∗
∑
i∈N∗
∑
j∈NP (i)∩N∗(vˆivˆj − vivj)ϕ˜iϕ˜′j = OP (1/n∗).
Proof: First, write vˆ − v = −Z(ρˆ− ρ0), where
ρˆ− ρ0 =
[
SZϕ˜Λˆ
−1S ′Zϕ˜
]−1
SZϕ˜Λˆ
−1Sϕ˜v.(C.13)
Following the same arguments as in the proof of Lemma C.4(i)(ii) and Lemma C.5, we
obtain the desired result. 
66
Proof of Theorem 3.1: Let us consider the first statement. We write
1√
n∗
Λˆ−1/2ϕ˜′vˆ =
1√
n∗
Λˆ−1/2ϕ˜′(vˆ − v) + 1√
n∗
Λˆ−1/2ϕ˜′v
= − 1√
n∗
Λˆ−1/2ϕ˜′Z(ρˆ− ρ0) + 1√
n∗
Λˆ−1/2ϕ˜′v =
√
n∗(I − P )Λˆ−1/2Sϕ˜v,
using (C.13), where
P = Λˆ−1/2S ′Zϕ˜
[
SZϕ˜Λˆ
−1S ′Zϕ˜
]−1
SZϕ˜Λˆ
−1/2.
Note that P is a projection matrix from RM onto the range space of Λˆ−1/2S ′Zϕ˜. Hence
combining Lemmas C.2 and C.5. We obtain the desired result. The second result follows
from Lemma C.2 and equation (C.13). 
Appendix D. Asymptotic Theory for the Model with First-Order
Sophisticated Agents
In this section, we develop asymptotic theory for the game with first-order sophisti-
cated agents. Recall from Theorem 2.2 that each player i’s best response sBR.FSi takes the
following form:
sBR.FSi (Ii1) = γ0Xi,1 + εi +
β0
nP (i)
∑
j∈NP (i)
λjj(γ
′
0Xj,1 + εj) + β
2
0
∑
j∈NP,2(i)
λ˜ij(γ
′
0Xj,1 + εj)
+ δ0X i,2 + δ
′
0β0
∑
j∈NP,2(i)
λ¯ijXj,2 + ηi,
where,
λ¯ij =
1
nP (i)
∑
k∈NP (i)
λkj1{j ∈ NP (k)}
nP (k)
, and
λ˜ij =
1
nP (i)
∑
k∈NP (i)
λkj1{j ∈ NP (k)}
nP (k)(1− β0ckk) .
In place of Assumptions 3.2 - 3.3, we make the following assumptions.
Assumption D.1. There exists c > 0 such that for all n∗ ≥ 1,
λmin(Sϕϕ) ≥ c, λmin(ΛFS) ≥ c,
λmin((S
FS
Zϕ˜)(S
FS
Zϕ˜)
′) ≥ c, and
λmin((S
FS
Zϕ˜)(Λ
FS)−1(SFSZϕ˜)
′) ≥ c.
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Assumption D.2. There exists a constant C > 0 such that for all n∗ ≥ 1,
max
i∈N◦2
||Xi||+ max
i∈N◦2
||ϕ˜i|| ≤ C
and E[ε4i |F ] + E[η4i |F ] < C, where n◦2 = |N◦2 | and
N◦2 =
⋃
i∈N∗
N¯P,2(i).
Then the asymptotic results are summarized in the following theorem.
Theorem D.1. Suppose that the conditions of Theorem 2.2, Assumption 3.4, and Assump-
tions D.1 - D.2 hold. Then,
T FS(β0)→d χ2M−d, and (Vˆ FS)−1/2
√
n∗(ρˆFS − ρ0)→d N(0, I),
as n∗ →∞.
The proofs follow similar steps as in the proof of Theorem 3.1. For the sake of trans-
parency, we provide complete proofs here.
Lemma D.1. Suppose that the conditions of Theorem D.1 hold. Then, as n∗ →∞,
(ΛFS)−1/2
1√
n∗
∑
i∈N∗
ϕ˜iv
FS
i →d N(0, IM).
Proof: Choose any vector b ∈ RM such that ||b|| = 1 and let ϕ˜i,b = b′ϕ˜i. Define
aFSi =
ϕ˜i,b(1 + β20 λ˜ii) + β0λiinP (i) ∑
j∈NP (i)∩N∗
ϕ˜j,b
 1{i ∈ N∗}+ β20 ∑
j∈NP,2(i)∩N∗
ϕ˜j,bλ˜ji.
Then we can write
1√
n∗
∑
i∈N∗
ϕ˜i,bv
FS
i =
∑
i∈N◦2
ξFSi ,(D.1)
where ξFSi = (a
FS
i εi + ϕ˜i,bηi1{i ∈ N∗})/
√
n∗. By the Berry-Esseen Lemma (e.g., Shorack
(2000), p.259),
sup
t∈R
∣∣∣P
∑
i∈N◦2
ξFSi
σFSξ,i
≤ t|F
− Φ(t)∣∣∣ ≤
9E
∑
i∈N◦2
|ξFSi |3|F

∑
i∈N◦2
(σFSξ,i)
2
3/2
,(D.2)
68
where (σFSξ,i)
2 = V ar(ξFSi |F). It suffices to show that the last bound vanishes in probability
as n∗ →∞. Again, since εi’s and ηi’s are independent,∑
i∈N◦2
σ2ξ,i ≥ σ2η > 0.
Observe that as in (C.10), for some constant C1 > 0,
E
∑
i∈N◦2
|ξFSi |3|F
 ≤ C1 maxi∈N E[|εi|3|F ]
(n∗)3/2
∑
i∈N◦2
|aFSi |3 +
C1n
◦
2 maxi∈N E[|ηi|3|F ]
(n∗)3/2
.
Note that λ˜ij ≤ C/(1− β0)2. Now, the leading term becomes
1
n∗
∑
i∈N◦2
|aFSi |3
≤ 1
n∗
∑
i∈N◦2
ϕ˜i,b(1 + β20 λ˜ii) + β0λiinP (i) ∑
j∈NP (i)∩N∗
ϕ˜j,b
 1{i ∈ N∗}+ β20 ∑
j∈NP,2(i)∩N∗
λ˜ji.
3
≤ C
(1− β0)6
1 + 1
n∗
∑
i∈N◦2
∑
j∈NP,2(i)∩N∗
1
nP (j)
∑
k∈NP (j)
1{i ∈ NP (k)}
 .
However, note that
1
n∗
∑
i∈N◦2
∑
j∈NP,2(i)∩N∗
1
nP (j)
∑
k∈NP (j)
1{i ∈ NP (k)}
=
1
n∗
∑
j∈N∗
∑
i∈N◦2
1{j ∈ NP,2(i)} 1
nP (j)
∑
k∈NP (j)
1{i ∈ NP (k)}.
The last term is equal to
1
n∗
∑
j∈N∗
1
nP (j)
∑
i∈N◦2
1{i ∈ NP,2(j)}
∑
k∈NP (j)
1{i ∈ NP (k)}
=
1
n∗
∑
j∈N∗
1
nP (j)
∑
i∈NP,2(j)
∑
k∈NP (j)
1{i ∈ NP (k)}
=
1
n∗
∑
j∈N∗
1
nP (j)
∑
i∈NP,2(j)
|NP (j) ∩NP (i)| ≤ C,
by Assumption 3.4. The second equality follows because GP is an undirected graph.
Hence, we find that for some C1 > 0,
E
[∑
i∈N∗
|ξFSi |3|F
]
≤ C1√
n∗
max
i∈N
E[|εi|3|F ] + C1n
◦
2
(n∗)3/2
max
i∈N
E[|ηi|3|F ].
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Thus we conclude that the bound in (C.9) is OP (1/
√
n∗ + n◦2/(n
∗√n∗)). Since n◦2 ≤ Cn∗,
we obtain the desired result. 
Lemma D.2. Suppose that the conditions of Theorem D.1 hold. Then,
||SFSϕ˜v ||2 ≤
C
n∗
,
for some constant C that does not depend on n.
Proof: Note that
||ΛFS|| ≤ σ
2
ε
n∗
∑
i∈N∗
∑
j∈N∗−i:NP,2(i)∩NP,2(j) 6=∅
|eFSij |||ϕ˜i||||ϕ˜j||(D.3)
+
1
n∗
∑
i∈N∗
(|eFSii |σ2ε + σ2η)||ϕ˜i||2.
However, since λ˜ij ≤ C/(1− β0)2 for some constant C > 0 and λij ≤ 1/(1− β0), we have
|eFSii | ≤
C1
(1− β0)2
1 + ∑
j∈NP,2(i)
|NP (i) ∩NP (j)|
nP (i)
 ≤ C2,(D.4)
for constants C1, C2 > 0. And as for |eFSij |, i 6= j, note that∑
k∈NP,2(i)∩NP,2(j)
λ˜ikλ˜jk ≤ C1
∑
k∈NP,2(i)∩NP,2(j)
|NP (i) ∩NP (k)||NP (j) ∩NP (k)|
nP (i)nP (k)
≤ C1
∑
k∈NP,2(i)
|NP (i) ∩NP (k)|
nP (i)
≤ C2,
for some constants C1, C2 > 0. Thus, we find that |eFSij | ≤ C. Therefore, both terms on the
right hand side of (D.3) is bounded by C/n∗. 
Lemma D.3. Suppose that the conditions of Theorem D.1 hold. Then the following holds.
(i) 1
n∗
∑
i∈N∗((v˜
FS
i )
2 − (vFSi )2)ϕ˜iϕ˜′i = OP (1/
√
n∗).
(ii) 1
n∗
∑
i∈N∗
∑
j∈NP (i)∩N∗(v˜
FS
i v˜
FS
j − vFSi vFSj )ϕ˜iϕ˜′j = OP (1/n∗).
(iii) 1
n∗
∑
i∈N∗((v
FS
i )
2 − E[(vFSi )2|F ])ϕ˜iϕ˜′i = OP (1/
√
n∗).
(iv) 1
n∗
∑
i∈N∗
∑
j∈NP (i)∩N∗(v
FS
i v
FS
j − E[vFSi vFSj |F ])ϕ˜iϕ˜′j = OP (1/
√
n∗).
Proof: (i) Note that∥∥∥∥∥ 1n∗ ∑
i∈N∗
(v˜FSi − vFSi )2ϕ˜iϕ˜′i
∥∥∥∥∥ ≤ Cn∗ ∑
i∈N∗
(v˜FSi − vFSi )2,
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for some constant C > 0. As for the last term, note that for some constant C > 0,
1
n∗
∑
i∈N∗
E
[
(v˜FSi − vFSi )2|F
] ≤ C
n∗
tr(ΛFS) = OP
(
1
n∗
)
,(D.5)
by Assumption D.1 and by Lemma D.2. However, we need to deal with∣∣∣ 1
n∗
∑
i∈N∗
((v˜FSi )
2 − (vFSi )2)
∣∣∣ ≤√ 1
n∗
∑
i∈N∗
(v˜FSi − vFSi )2
√
1
n∗
∑
i∈N∗
(v˜FSi + v
FS
i )
2.
Note that
1
n∗
∑
i∈N∗
(v˜FSi + v
FS
i )
2 ≤ 2
n∗
∑
i∈N∗
(v˜FSi − vFSi )2 +
8
n∗
∑
i∈N∗
(vFSi )
2
= OP
(
1
n∗
)
+
8
n∗
∑
i∈N∗
(vFSi )
2.
As for the last term,
1
n∗
∑
i∈N∗
E[(vFSi )
2|F ] ≤ 2
n∗
∑
i∈N∗
E[RFSi (ε)
2|F ] + 2
n∗
∑
i∈N∗
E[η2i |F ].
The last term is bounded by σ2η, and the first term on the right hand side is bounded by
2σ2ε
n∗
∑
i∈N∗
eFSii ≤ C,
for some constant C > 0, by (D.4). Combining this with (D.5), we obtain the desired
result.
(ii) Define
An,1 =
1
n∗
∑
i∈N∗
∑
j∈NP (i)∩N∗
(v˜FSi − vFSi )(v˜FSj − vFSj )
An,2 =
1
n∗
∑
i∈N∗
∑
j∈NP (i)∩N∗
(v˜FSi − vFSi )vFSj , and
An,3 =
1
n∗
∑
i∈N∗
∑
j∈NP (i)∩N∗
vFSi (v˜
FS
j − vFSj ),
and write
1
n∗
∑
i∈N∗
∑
j∈NP (i)∩N∗
(v˜FSi v˜
FS
j − vFSi vFSj ) = An,1 + An,2 + An,3.
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As for the leading term, by Cauchy-Schwarz inequality,
|An,1| =
√
1
n∗
∑
i∈N∗
(v˜FSi − vFSi )2
√√√√√ 1
n∗
∑
i∈N∗
 ∑
j∈NP (i)∩N∗
(v˜FSj − vFSj )
2.
Note that
1
n∗
∑
i∈N∗
E
 ∑
j∈NP (i)∩N∗
(v˜FSj − vFSj )
2 |F

≤ 1
n∗
∑
i∈N∗
|NP (i) ∩N∗|
∑
j∈NP (i)∩N∗
E
[(
v˜FSj − vFSj
)2 |F]
=
1
n∗
∑
i∈N∗
 ∑
j∈NP (i)∩N∗
|NP (j) ∩N∗|
E [(v˜FSi − vFSi )2 |F] ,
where the equality above uses Lemma C.1. Hence the last term is bounded by
maxi∈N∗ |NP (i) ∩N∗|2
n∗
∑
i∈N∗
E
[(
v˜FSi − vFSi
)2 |F] ≤ OP ( 1
n∗
)
,
by (D.5). Thus we conclude that |An,1| = OP (1/n∗).
Similarly, using Cauchy-Schwarz inequality and applying the same arguments, we have
|An,2| = OP
(
1
n∗
)
and |An,3| = OP
(
1
n∗
)
,
obtaining the desired result.
(iii) Note that
V ar
(
1
n∗
∑
i∈N∗
RFSi (ε)|F
)
≤ 1
(n∗)2
∑
i∈N∗
E[(RFSi (ε))
2|F ] = OP ((n∗)−1),
from the proof of (i).
(iv) The proof is similar to (iii). Hence we omit the details. 
Lemma D.4. Suppose that the conditions of Theorem D.1 hold. Then,
ΛˆFS − ΛFS = OP
(
1√
n∗
)
.
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Proof: We write
ΛˆFS1 − ΛFS1 =
1
n∗
∑
i∈N∗
((vˆFSi )
2 − E[(vFSi )2|F ])ϕ˜iϕ˜′i and
ΛˆFS2 − ΛFS2 =
sˆFSε − sFSε
n∗
∑
i∈N∗
∑
j∈NP (i)∩N∗
qFSij,εϕ˜iϕ˜
′
j.
Thus the desired result follows from Lemma D.3. 
Lemma D.5. Suppose that the conditions of Theorem D.1 hold. Then the following holds.
(i) 1
n∗
∑
i∈N∗((vˆ
FS
i )
2 − (vFSi )2)ϕ˜iϕ˜′i = OP (1/n∗).
(ii) 1
n∗
∑
i∈N∗
∑
j∈NP (i)∩N∗(vˆ
FS
i vˆ
FS
j − vFSi vFSj )ϕ˜iϕ˜′j = OP (1/
√
n∗).
Proof: The proof is the same as that of Lemma C.6. 
Proof of Theorem D.1: The proof is precisely the same as that of Theorem 3.1 except
that we use the above auxiliary lemmas instead. Details are omitted. 
Appendix E. Monte Carlo Simulations for Games with the First
Order Sophisticated Players
In this section, we investigate the finite sample properties of the inference for first-order
sophisticated types across various configurations of the payoff graphs GP . We generate
graphs for the two specifications models and check our inference under different param-
eters, described in the following paragraph. Specification 1 uses an Erdo¨s-Re´nyi (random
graph formation) payoff graph and Specification 2 uses Baraba´si-Albert (preferential at-
tachment) graphs seeded with an Erdo¨s-Re´nyi graph of the smallest integer larger than
5
√
n. Some summary statistics of the graphs used for the Monte Carlo study is given in
Table 6.
For the simulations, we also set the following: ρ0 = (γ′0, δ
′
0)
′, with γ0 = (2, 4, 1)′, and
δ0 = (3, 4)
′. We also choose a to be a vector of ones so that a′ρ0 = 14. The variables ε
and η are drawn iid N(0, 1). The first column of Xi,1 is a column of ones. The remaining
columns of Xi,1 are drawn independently from N(1, 1) and the columns of Xi,2 are drawn
independently from N(3, 1).
We generate Yi from the best response function in Theorem 2.2. For instruments, we
consider the following nonlinear transformations of X1 and X2:
φi = [Z˜i,1, X
2
i,1, X
2
i,2, X
3
i,2]
′,
where we define Z˜i,1 ≡ 1nP (i)
∑
j∈NP (i) λijXj,1.
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TABLE 6. The Average and Maximum Degrees of Graphs in the Simulations
Specification 1 Specification 2
n m = 1 m = 2 m = 3 λ = 1 λ = 2 λ = 3
500 dmx 17 21 30 5 8 11
dav 1.7600 3.2980 4.8340 0.9520 1.9360 2.9600
1000 dmx 18 29 34 6 7 9
dav 1.8460 3.5240 5.2050 0.9960 1.9620 3.0020
Notes: dav and dmx represent the average and maximum degrees of the networks respectively; that is,
dav ≡ 1n
∑
i∈N nP (i) and dmx ≡ maxi∈N nP (i).
The results are found in Tables 7-10. In Tables 7 and 8 we report the finite sample
coverage probabilities of the confidence intervals for β0 and for a′ρ0 respectively. For
β0, the coverage probabilities perform very well, whereas for a′ρ0, they are conservative,
except for when β0 = −0.5. Overall, for the range of the sample sizes 500 − 1000, the
finite sample properties of the inference procedure seem reasonable.
In Tables 9-10, we report the average length of the confidence intervals. Clearly, as
we increase the sample size from 500 to 1000, the length of the confidence intervals
tends to shrink substantially. This suggests that accummulation of data leads to increased
information and improved accuracy in inference.
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TABLE 7. The Empirical Coverage Probability of Confidence Intervals for β0
from First-Order Sophisticated Types
Specification 1 Specification 2
β0 m = 1 m = 2 m = 3 λ = 1 λ = 2 λ = 3
−0.5 n = 500 0.9650 0.9645 0.9580 0.9535 0.9580 0.9510
n = 1000 0.9570 0.9520 0.9555 0.9550 0.9585 0.9550
−0.3 n = 500 0.9625 0.9630 0.9655 0.9540 0.9630 0.9585
n = 1000 0.9600 0.9540 0.9535 0.9555 0.9570 0.9540
0 n = 500 0.9725 0.9670 0.9700 0.9705 0.9700 0.9660
n = 1000 0.9735 0.9695 0.9705 0.9725 0.9760 0.9695
0.3 n = 500 0.9595 0.9565 0.9580 0.9550 0.9630 0.9575
n = 1000 0.9505 0.9500 0.9535 0.9505 0.9570 0.9580
0.5 n = 500 0.9545 0.9500 0.9550 0.9530 0.9545 0.9540
n = 1000 0.9505 0.9455 0.9495 0.9485 0.9535 0.9585
Notes: This table shows the empirical coverage probabilities R = 2000 of the confidence intervals for β0
under two models of graph formation. The nominal size is α = 0.05. As expected, the coverage
probabilities are close to the nominal size.
TABLE 8. The Empirical Coverage Probability of Confidence Interval for
a′ρ0 for First-Order Sophisticated Types
Specification 1 Specification 2
β0 m = 1 m = 2 m = 3 λ = 1 λ = 2 λ = 3
−0.5 n = 500 0.9645 0.9500 0.9580 0.9570 0.9510 0.9490
n = 1000 0.9510 0.9440 0.9450 0.9585 0.9550 0.9430
−0.3 n = 500 0.9880 0.9840 0.9845 0.9540 0.9655 0.9780
n = 1000 0.9690 0.9705 0.9775 0.9545 0.9570 0.9675
0 n = 500 0.9955 0.9920 0.9915 0.9795 0.9865 0.9885
n = 1000 0.9935 0.9895 0.9895 0.9645 0.9875 0.9915
0.3 n = 500 0.9910 0.9865 0.9845 0.9790 0.9850 0.9845
n = 1000 0.9855 0.9810 0.9830 0.9560 0.9825 0.9865
0.5 n = 500 0.9900 0.9855 0.9825 0.9770 0.9840 0.9840
n = 1000 0.9805 0.9800 0.9840 0.9550 0.9820 0.9855
Notes: This table shows the empirical coverage probabilities R = 2000 of the confidence intervals for a′ρ0
under two models of graph formation. The nominal size is α = 0.05. The procedure is conservative, as
expected from the Bonferroni procedure.
Appendix F. Model Selection between Γ0 and Γ1
In this section, we provide conditions and a brief proof for the asymptotic justification
of the model selection procedure explained in Section 3.4 of the main paper. For brevity,
we will provide high level conditions and discussions on how they can be verified using
low level conditions.
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TABLE 9. The Average Length of Confidence Intervals for β0 for First-Order
Sophisticated Types
Specification 1 Specification 2
β0 m = 1 m = 2 m = 3 λ = 1 λ = 2 λ = 3
−0.5 n = 500 0.0231 0.0648 0.1165 0.0032 0.0127 0.0353
n = 1000 0.0093 0.0332 0.0623 0.0000 0.0006 0.0129
−0.3 n = 500 0.1080 0.1586 0.2122 0.0834 0.0936 0.1067
n = 1000 0.0565 0.0982 0.1421 0.0445 0.0519 0.0684
0 n = 500 0.1890 0.2517 0.3120 0.1467 0.1493 0.1768
n = 1000 0.1026 0.1551 0.2208 0.0844 0.0820 0.1019
0.3 n = 500 0.2772 0.3480 0.3868 0.1812 0.2390 0.3083
n = 1000 0.1808 0.2406 0.3154 0.1100 0.1408 0.1957
0.5 n = 500 0.2357 0.3639 0.3894 0.1184 0.2116 0.3239
n = 1000 0.1488 0.2396 0.3173 0.0713 0.1209 0.2099
Notes: This table shows the average length of confidence intervals for β0 for two models of graph
formation R = 2000. The nominal size is α = 0.05. As expected the average length of the confidence
interval falls with n.
TABLE 10. Average Length of of Confidence Intervals for a′ρ0 for First-
Order Sophisticated Types
Specification 1 Specification 2
β0 m = 1 m = 2 m = 3 λ = 1 λ = 2 λ = 3
−0.5 n = 500 1.1556 1.9668 2.7863 0.9049 0.9111 1.4815
n = 1000 0.6727 1.1769 1.7051 0.5029 0.3118 0.7350
−0.3 n = 500 2.3161 2.8969 3.5473 2.0824 2.0270 2.4005
n = 1000 1.5239 1.9481 2.5040 1.1596 1.1930 1.6091
0 n = 500 2.8219 3.6176 4.2395 2.6269 2.4597 2.9097
n = 1000 1.6295 2.3752 3.0650 1.5548 1.4384 1.7895
0.3 n = 500 3.6137 4.2661 4.5862 2.9024 3.3231 3.8490
n = 1000 2.3065 3.0828 3.7455 1.7993 2.0083 2.5662
0.5 n = 500 3.1015 4.2530 4.3902 1.8544 2.8147 3.8359
n = 1000 1.9467 2.9073 3.5689 1.1289 1.5829 2.5132
Notes: The true a′ρ0 is equal to 14. The length of confidence intervals tends to be small and substantially
shortened as the size of the network increases.
Let us first define for each δ > 0:
pn,1(δ) = inf
P∈Pn,1(δ)
P
{
TST ≤ c1−α/2, TFS > c1−α/2
}
pn,2(δ) = inf
P∈Pn,2(δ)
P
{
TST > c1−α/2, TFS ≤ c1−α/2
}
pn,3(δ) = inf
P∈Pn,3(δ)
P
{
TST ≤ c1−α/2, TFS ≤ c1−α/2
}
, and
pn,4(δ) = inf
P∈Pn,4(δ)
P
{
TST > c1−α/2, TFS > c1−α/2
}
.
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Then, we make the following assumption:
min
{
lim inf
n→∞
pn,1(δ), lim inf
n→∞
pn,2(δ)
}
≥ 1− α/2,(F.1)
lim inf
n→∞
pn,2(δ) ≥ 1− α,
pn,2(δ)→ 1, as n→∞.
The assumptions in (F.1) follow if the tests 1{T ST(β0) > c1−α/2} and 1{T FS(β0) > c1−α/2}
are asymptotically valid uniformly over the probabilities that satisfy the respective mo-
ment conditions ms = 0, and if the tests are consistent under fixed alternatives (i.e.,
ms > δ). The uniform validity of the tests can be proved by invoking the uniform bound-
edness of certain moments and eigenvalues of the variance matrices, and by using Berry-
Esseen Lemma. As such arguments are standard, details are omitted here.
Under the assumptions in (F.1), it is not hard to see that
lim inf
n→∞
inf
P∈Pn(δ)
P{S0 = Sˆ} ≥ 1− α.
Indeed, noting that Pn(δ) is partitioned into Pn,k(δ), k = 1, ..., 4, we can write
lim inf
n→∞
inf
P∈Pn(δ)
P{S0 = Sˆ} = lim inf
n→∞
min
1≤k≤4
inf
P∈Pn,k(δ)
P{S0 = Sˆ}
= min
1≤k≤4
lim inf
n→∞
inf
P∈Pn,k(δ)
P{S0 = Sˆ}.
The assumptions in (F.1) tell us that the last term is bounded from below by 1− α.
Appendix G. Testing for Information Sharing on Unobserv-
ables
G.1. The Model with Simple Players
One may want to see how much empirical relevance there is for incorporating infor-
mation sharing on unobservables. Here we explain how one can performa a formal test
of information sharing for the case of β0 6= 0. Observe that when β0 = 0, presence of
information sharing on unobservables is not testable. When β0 = 0, it follows that
sBRi (Ii) = X ′i,1γ0 +X ′i,2δ0 + vi,
where vi = εi + ηi. In this case, it is not possible to distinguish between contributions
from εi and ηi.
Consider the following hypotheses:
H0 : σ
2
ε = 0, and H1 : σ
2
ε > 0.
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The null hypothesis tells us that there is no information sharing on unobservables. Let
vˆi(β), aε(β) and bε(β) be the same as vˆi, aε and bε (defined in Appendix B) only with β0
replaced by generic β. From here on we assume that β0 6= 0.
The main idea for testing the hypothesis is that when σ2ε > 0, this implies cross-
sectional dependence of residuals vi. For testing, we need to compute the sample version
of the covariance between vi and vj for GP -neighbors i and j. However, Condition C
alone does not guarantee that for each i ∈ N∗, we will be able to compute vˆj for some
j ∈ NP (i), because there may not exist such j for some i ∈ N∗ at all. Thus let us introduce
an additional data requirement as follows:
Condition D: For each i ∈ N∗, the econometrician observes a nonempty subset N˜(i) ⊂
NP (i) (possibly a singleton) of agents where for each j ∈ N˜(i), the econometrician ob-
serves Yj, |NP (j) ∩NP (k)|, nP (k) and Xk for all k ∈ NP (j).
Condition D is satisfied if there are many agents in the data set where each agent
has at least one GP -neighbor j for which the econometrician observes the outcome Yj,
the number of their GP -neighbors, the observed characteristics of their GP -neighbors,
and the number of the agents who are both their GP -neighbors and the neighbors of
their GP -neighbors. The asymptotic validity of inference is not affected if the researcher
chooses a nonempty subset N˜(i) in Condition D as a singleton subset, say, j(i) ⊂ NP (i),
j(i) ∈ N , such that we observe Yj(i), |NP (j(i))∩NP (k)|, nP (k) and Xk for all k ∈ NP (j(i))
are available in the data, so far as the choice is not based on Yi’s but on X only. While
this data requirement can still be restrictive in some cases where one obtains a partial
observation of GP , it is still weaker than the usual assumption that the econometrician
observes GP fully together with (Yi, X ′i)i∈N .
Now let us reformulate the null and the alternative hypotheses as follows:
H0 :
1
n∗
∑
i∈N∗
∑
j∈N˜(i)
E[vivj|F ] = 0, and(G.1)
H1 :
1
n∗
∑
i∈N∗
∑
j∈N˜(i)
E[vivj|F ] 6= 0.(G.2)
For testing, we propose the following method. Let Cβ1−(α/2) be the (1 − (α/2))-level
confidence interval for β. We consider the following test statistics:
ÎU = inf
β∈Cβ
1−(α/2)
1
2Sˆ4(β)n∗
∑
i∈N∗
∑
j∈N˜(i)
vˆi(β)vˆj(β)
2 ,
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where
Sˆ2(β) =
d˜
1/2
av
n∗
∑
i∈N∗
vˆ2i (β), and d˜av =
1
n∗
∑
i∈N∗
|N˜(i)|.
When the confidence set includes zero, the power of the test becomes asymptotically
trivial, as expected from the previous remark that information sharing on unobservables
is not testable when β0 = 0.
As for the critical value, we take the (1−(α/2))-percentile from the χ2 distribution with
degree of freedom 1, which we denote by c1−(α/2). Then the level α-test based on the test
statistic ÎU rejects the null hypothesis if and only if ÎU > c1−(α/2).
Theorem G.1. Suppose that the conditions of Theorem 2.1 and Assumptions 3.1 - 3.4 hold.
Then, uunder the null hypothesis in (G.1),
lim
n∗→∞
P
{
ÎU > c1−α/2
}
≤ α,
as n∗ →∞.
Proof: First, note that
1√
n∗
∑
i∈N∗
∑
j∈N˜(i)
(vˆivˆj − vivj) = OP (1/
√
n∗),
by following precisely the same proof as that of Lemma C.4(ii). (Recall that N˜(i) is
defined in Condition D in Section G.1.) Now, we let
σ2 = V ar
 1√
n∗
∑
i∈N∗
∑
j∈N˜(i)
ηiηj|F

and write
1
σ
√
n∗
∑
i∈N∗
∑
j∈N˜(i)
vivj =
1√
n∗
∑
i∈N∗
ri,
where
ri =
1
σ
∑
j∈N˜(i)
ηiηj,
because vi = ηi under the null hypothesis. Note that E[ri|F ] = 0. Let G∗P be a graph on
N∗ such that i and j are adjacent if and only if j ∈ N˜(i) or i ∈ N˜(j). Then {ri}i∈N∗ has
G∗P as a dependency graph conditional on F . Now we show the following:
(n∗)−1/4
√
µ33 + (n
∗)−1/2µ24 →P 0,(G.3)
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where for p ≥ 1,
µp = max
i∈N∗
(E[|ri|p|F ])1/p .
Then by Theorem 2.3 of Penrose (2003), we obtain that
1
σ
√
n∗
∑
i∈N∗
∑
j∈N˜(i)
vivj →d N(0, 1),
as n∗ →∞. First, note that
σ2 = E
 1√
n∗
∑
i∈N∗
∑
j∈N˜(i)
ηiηj
2 |F

=
1√
n∗
∑
i1∈N∗
∑
j1∈N˜(i1)
∑
i2∈N∗
∑
j2∈N˜(i2)
E [ηi1ηj1ηi2ηj2 |F ] .
Note that in the quadruple sum, i1 6= j1 and i2 6= j2. There are only two ways the last
conditional expectation is not zero: either i1 = i2 and j1 = j2 or j1 = i2 and i1 = j2,
because ηi’s are independent across i’s and its conditional expectation given F is zero.
Hence the last term is equal to
2σ4η
n∗
∑
i∈N∗
|N˜(i)| = 2σ4ηd˜av(G.4)
Hence for any p ≥ 2,
µpp =
1
σp
max
i∈N∗
E
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
j∈N˜(i)
ηiηj
∣∣∣∣∣∣
p
|F
 ≤ maxi,j∈N∗ E[|ηiηj|p|F ]
σp
≤ maxi,j∈N∗ E[|ηiηj|
p|F ]
2pσ2pη d˜
p
av
.
Note that d˜av ≥ 1 because N˜(i) 6= ∅ for all i ∈ N∗. Thus (G.3) follows. Now, by Lemma
C.4, and in the light of the expression (G.4), it is not hard to see that
2Sˆ4(β0) = σ
2 + oP (1).
The desired result follows from this and the Bonferroni procedure. 
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G.2. The Model with First Order Sophisticated Players
Let us develop a test for information sharing on unobservables when the game is pop-
ulated by the first order sophicated players. When β0 = 0, it follows that
sBR.FSi (Ii,1) = X ′i,1γ0 +X ′i,2δ0 + vFSi ,
where vFSi = εi + ηi. Therefore, we have s
BR
i (Ii,0) = sBR.FSi (Ii,1) and just as in the case of a
simple type model, it is not possible to distinguish between contributions from εi and ηi.
Thus let us assume that β0 6= 0. The presence of cross-sectional correlation of residuals
vFSi serves as a testable implications from information sharing on unobservables. As in
the case of a model with agents of simple type, we need to strengthen Condition D as
follows:
Condition D1: For each i ∈ N∗, the econometrician observes a nonempty subset N˜(i) ⊂
NP (i) (possibly a singleton) of agents where for each j ∈ N˜(i), the econometrician ob-
serves Yj, |NP (j) ∩NP (k)|, nP (k) and Xk for all k ∈ NP,2(j).
Similarly as before, we consider the following test statistics:
ÎU
FS
= inf
β∈Cβ
1−(α/2)
1
2(SˆFS(β))4n∗
∑
i∈N∗
∑
j∈N˜(i)
vˆFSi (β)vˆ
FS
j (β)
2 ,
where
(SˆFS(β))2 =
d˜
1/2
av
n∗
∑
i∈N∗
vˆ2i (β).
As before, we reject the null hypothesis of no information sharing on unobservables if
and only if ÎU
FS
> c1−(α/2), where c1−(α/2) is the (1− (α/2))-percentile of χ21. Asymptotic
validity of this procedure can be shown in a similar manner as for the case of simple
types.
Appendix H. Convergence of Behavioral Strategies
In this section, we prove Lemma 2.1 and Theorem 2.3.
Proof of Lemma 2.1: For simplicity, we will show the case with γ0 = 0. (The role of
X ′i,1γ0 is similar to that of εi in the proof.) We show this by induction. For the case of
m = 0, we observe from Theorem 2.1 that
sBRi,0 (Ii,0) = tr
(
Wi,(0),εε
′ +Wi,(0),2X ′2
)
.
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Suppose that for some m ≥ 1, the equation (2.7) holds for game Γm. Let w(m)ij,` be
weights given by player i to player j’s types εj or Xj,2, depending on ` = ε or ` = 2, in
the best response strategy for agent i in game Γm. Let us setWi,(m),`, ` ∈ {ε, 2}, such that
Wi,(m),ε is an n× 1 vector with the j-th entry given by w(m)ij,ε 1{j ∈ NP,m+1(i)} andWi,(m),2
is an n× dx2 matrix whose (j, k)-th entry is given by w(m)ij,2,k1{j ∈ NP,m+1(i)}, where w(m)ij,2,k
denotes the k-th entry of w(m)ij,2 . By the induction hypothesis, we should have
Wi,(m),` = ai,` +
β0
nP (i)
∑
k∈NP (i)
Wk,(m−1),`, ` = ε, 2.(H.1)
Let wikj,` be the weight that player i believes to be given by player k to εj or Xj,2
depending on whether ` = ε or ` = 2. The best response strategy profile from game Γm+1
is then given by
sBRi,m+1(Ii,m+1) = εi
1 + β0
nP (i)
∑
k∈NP (i)
wiki,ε1{i ∈ NP (k)}

+
β0
nP (i)
∑
k∈NP (i)
wiki,2Xi,21{j ∈ NP (k)}+ δ′0X i,2
+
β0
nP (i)
∑
k∈NP (i)
∑
j∈NI(i)
(
wikj,εεj + w
i
kj,2Xj,2
)
1{j ∈ NP (k)}.
The players from game Γm+1 believe that for l ∈ {ε, 2}, wiki,` = w(m)ki,` and wikj,` = w(m)kj,` , and
hence we can rewrite the best response of the (m+ 1)-th order sophisticated types as
sBRi,m+1(Ii,m+1) = tr
ai,ε + β0
nP (i)
∑
k∈NP (i)
Wk,(m),ε
 ε′
(H.2)
+ tr
ai,2 + β0
nP (i)
∑
k∈NP (i)
Wk,(m),2
X ′2
 .
Since by definition, for each ` ∈ {ε, 2},
Wi,(m+1),` = ai,` +
β0
nP (i)
∑
k∈NP (i)
Wk,(m),`,(H.3)
the desired result follows for the game Γm+1. 
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Proof of Theorem 2.3: From the result of Lemma 2.1 and H.1, we find that for any
m,m′ > 0,
|si,m+1(Ii,m+1)− si,m′+1(Ii,m′+1)| ≤ |β0| 1
nP (i)
∑
k∈NP (i)
|sk,m(Ik,m)− sk,m′(Ik,m′)|.(H.4)
Let F be the collection of all the I-measurable Rn-valued maps f = (fi)i∈N such that
E[f 2i ] < ∞ for each i ∈ N . We endow F with a pseudo metric: for f = (fi)i∈N and
g = (gi)i∈N ,
‖f − g‖2 = max
1≤i≤n
√
E[(fi − gi)2].(H.5)
As usual, we view (F , ‖ · ‖2) as a collection of equivalence classes on which d(f, g) ≡
‖f − g‖2 is a metric. Since√
1
n
∑
i∈N
E[(fi − gi)2] ≤ ‖f − g‖2 ≤
√∑
i∈N
E[(fi − gi)2],(H.6)
the metric space (F , ‖ · ‖2) is complete, a property inherited from the completeness of an
L2 space.
Each strategy profile s(Im)(ω) from game Γm belongs to (F , ‖·‖2). Consider a sequence
of best response strategy profiles {sBRm (Im)}∞m=1. Certainly by (H.4) and the fact that
|β0| < 1, the sequence {sBRm (Im)}∞m=1 is Cauchy in (F , ‖ · ‖2), and has a limit, say, s∞(I)
in F by its completeness. Now, it remains to show that s∞(I) is identical to s∗(I) almost
everywhere. To see this, note from (H.2) that
sBRi,m+1(Ii,m+1) = εi +
1
nP (i)
∑
k∈NP (i)
X ′k,2δ0(H.7)
+ β0
1
nP (i)
∑
k∈NP (i)
tr
(
Wk,(m),εε
′ +Wk,(m),2X ′2
)
= εi +X
′
i,2δ0 + β0
1
nP (i)
∑
k∈NP (i)
sBRk,m(Ik,m).
Let us view sBRm+1(Im+1) as an n-dim column vector of sBRi,m+1(Ii,m+1), i ∈ N , X2 an n× dx2
matrix, and A an n× n matrix whose (i, j)-th entry is given by 1{j ∈ NP (i)}/nP (i). Then
we can rewrite (H.7) as
sBRm (Im) = ε+X ′2δ0 + β0AsBRm−1(Im−1),
where ε = (εi)i∈N . This implies that
s∞(I)− (ε+X ′2δ0 + β0As∞(I)) = s∞(I)− sBRm (Im) + β0A(sBRm−1(Im−1)− s∞(I)).
83
Thus we have ∥∥∥s∞(I)− (ε+X ′2δ0 + β0As∞(I))∥∥∥
2
≤ ∥∥s∞(I)− sBRm (Im)∥∥2 + |β0|‖A‖∥∥sBRm−1(Im−1)− s∞(I)∥∥2 ,
where ‖A‖ = √tr(A′A). Note that ‖A‖ < ∞ and does not depend on m. Hence by
sending m→∞, we have∥∥∥s∞(I)− (ε+X ′2δ0 + β0As∞(I))∥∥∥
2
= 0.(H.8)
Since |β0| < 1 and A is row normalized, the matrix I − β0A is invertible and the row
sums of (I − β0A)−1 are uniformly bounded (e.g. see Lee (2002), p.257). Therefore, if
we define
s˜(I) = (I − β0A)−1(ε+X ′2δ0),
we have ‖s˜(I)‖2 < ∞ by (2.8). On the other hand, it is not hard to see that s˜(I) is
almost everywhere identical to the equilibrium strategy profile s∗(I). Also, by (H.8),
s˜(I) is almost everywhere identical to s∞(I). The desired result follows by (H.6) and the
fact that
E
[
max
i∈N
(fi − gi)2
]
≤
∑
i∈N
E[(fi − gi)2].

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Appendix I. Empirical Results Based on a Game with the First
Order Sophisticated Players
In this section, we report the empirical results based on the game Γ1 populated by the
first order sophisticated players. The results are found in Table 11.
Compared to the results with simple types (in Table 5), the confidence sets for β in the
game with first order sophisticated types are wider. For all specifications, the confidence
sets for β for the FOS types includes the confidence set for β for the simple type. In
general, the average marginal effects are similar across both models. A smaller confi-
dence set is found for the average marginal effect of colonial state agencies for first order
sophisticated players.27
We note that the instruments used below are similar to those for simple players: poly-
nomials of Xi,1 and a set of instruments that captures the cross-sectional dependence
along the payoff graph (Z˜i = nP (i)−1
∑
j∈N¯P,2(i) λ˜ijXj,1). This latter class of instruments
differs slightly in specification from those from Table 5 due to the differences in cross-
sectional dependence generated from the game Γ0 to the one in Γ1 (see the differences
between Theorems 2.1 and 2.2).
Given the results for the empirical model based on the game Γ1, we then conduct the
model selection procedure developed in Section 3.4. This selects among the simple type
and first order sophisticated type models. Table 12 presents the results. As the results
show, the data did not reject either of the models ST and FS at 5%.
27Recall that the average marginal effect for Colonial State Officials is its γ coefficient, as it enters linearly
in X1. For distance to Royal Roads, which enters quadratically in X1, the average marginal effect is
γRoyal Roads + 2γRoyal Roads2Royal Roads, where γRoyal Roads is the coefficient on the linear term of the
variable, γRoyal Roads2 is the coefficient on the quadratic term, and Royal Roads is its empirical average. A
similar expression holds for the Colonial State Agencies variable.
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TABLE 11. State Presence and Networks Effects across Colombian Municipalities,
First Order Sophisticated Types
Outcome: The Number of State Employees
Baseline Distance to Highway Land Quality Rivers
(1) (2) (3) (4)
β0 [0.04, 0.40] [−0.02, 0.48] [−0.04, 0.47] [−0.02, 0.44]
dyi/d(colonial state [−0.001,−0.000] [−0.001,−0.000] [−0.001,−0.000] [−0.001,−0.00]
officials)
Average
dyi/d(colonial state [−0.160, 0.138] [−0.156, 0.142] [−0.126, 0.148] [−0.128, 0.150]
agencies)
Average
dyi/d(distance to [−0.004, 0.005] [−0.003, 0.006] [−0.002, 0.007] [−0.003, 0.006]
Royal Roads)
n 1018 1018 1003 1003
Notes: Confidence sets for β are presented in the table, obtained from inverting the test statistic T (β)
from Section 3 for First Order Sophisticated types, with confidence level of 95%. The critical values in
the first row come from the asymptotic statistic. Downweighting is used. The average marginal effects
for historical variables upon state capacity are also shown. The marginal effect of Colonial State Officials
is equal to its γ coefficient. The marginal effect for Distance to Royal Roads for municipality i equals
γRoyal Roads + 2 ∗ γRoyal Roads2(Royal Roads)i, where γRoyal Roads is the γ coefficient of its linear term,
and γRoyal Roads2 is the coefficient of its quadratic term, as this variable enters X1as a quadratic form.
The analogous expression holds for the variable Colonial State Agencies. We show the average marginal
effect for these two variables. We then present the confidence set for these marginal effects, computed
by the inference procedure on a′γ developed in Section 3. All specifications include controls of latitude,
longitude, surface area, elevation, rainfall, as well as Department and Department capital dummies.
Instruments are constructed from payoff neighbors’ sum of the GP neighbors values of the historical
variables Total Crown Employees, Colonial State Agencies, Colonial State Agencies squared, population
in 1843, distance to Royal Roads, distance to Royal Roads squared, together with the non-linear function
Z˜i = nP (i)
−1∑
j∈N¯P,2(i) λ˜ijXj,1. Column (2) includes distance to current highway in X1, Column (3)
expands the specification of Column (2) by also including controls for land quality (share in each quality
level). Column (4) controls for rivers in the municipality and land quality, in addition to those controls
from Column (1). One can see that the results are very stable across specifications.
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TABLE 12. Model Selection, Simple Type or First Order Sophisticated
Specification
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Test Statistics and p-values (in parentheses)
TST 5.729 (0.572) 6.321 (0.503) 2.923 (0.892) 8.969 (0.255)
TFS 10.315 (0.171) 7.809 (0.350) 6.613 (0.470) 7.605 (0.369)
Models Not Rejected
Sˆ {ST, FS} {ST, FS} {ST, FS} {ST, FS}
Notes: The table shows the results of the Model Selection test, developed in Section 3.4. ST refers
to the simple type model, FS to the First Order Sophisticated. The critical value for the test, with
7 degrees of freedom (M − d) and level α = 0.05, is 16.013. The specifications in each column are
the same as those in Table 11. The first panel shows the values of the statistics, with the p-values in
parentheses. The bottom panel shows the set Sˆ of models that are not rejected by the test.
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